By Dawa Tshering
Originally termed the Ledo Road, the 1,736-kilometre Stilwell Road was built during World War II from Ledo in Assam to Kunming so that the Western Allies could supply Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang forces to fight the Japanese during the World War II. It was renamed after General Vinegar Joe Stilwell of the US Army in 1945. The reopening of the Stilwell road could reduce by 30 per cent the cost of transporting goods between India and China, providing a boost to Sino-Indian overland trade in a few years. It could also boost trade with the ASEAN countries, an important goal of India’s Look-East policy. But there are other issues involved that require caution.
The economic gains that can be accrued from the reopening of the Stilwell Road cannot be denied. However, atmospheres of goodwill have a sense of immediacy and are time-
bound, and much more needs to be done to exploit the present momentum in Indo-Myanmarese relations. For this, the attention on Stilwell Road could quite possibly overshadow the consideration that ought to be given to the maintenance and regulation of projects and cross-border routes already in existence. There are, therefore, some crucial points that merit attention.
The Stilwell Road was used as a supply line for military troops during World War II, after which it became redundant. It has never been used for trade purposes and to ask for its “reopening”, in that context, is a fallacy. The currently operating border point is at Moreh in Manipur, which connects with Tamu in Myanmar. It has been recorded that a significant amount of illegal trade occurs across the border. Although the list of tradable items across the Northeastern border was recently expanded from 22 to 40 items, border trade is still wanting in various aspects, such as infrastructure and security mechanisms. Working on the assumption that this pattern is likely to be replicated in the case of Stilwell, it can be said that its operationalisation is not a short- term goal. Therefore, while discussion in policy circles about the enormous gains to be had from the reopening of this route in the absence of any official undertaking is all very well, steps must also be taken to ensure that they do not cloud the work that needs to be done in strengthening the point at Moreh, and operationalising agreements made on other border points, such as Zowkathar (Mizoram)-Rhi (Myanmar).
The primary importance for this renewal of interest is due to the passage it provides to Yunnan in China. This could potentially assign secondary importance to Myanmar, which would serve as the transit country. Although there are no reports on whether Myanmar will be a transit route or a trade point extending to Kunming via Stilwell, the linkage that it will help establish with China is given much more prominence. It is important to note that both trade with and through Myanmar is vital for India’s Northeastern states and for this purpose routes in operation would serve just as well.
Myanmar plays a decisive role in India’s “Look-East” Policy because it is India’s access point to East and Southeast Asian markets. Myanmar this year indicated its willingness to implement market reform and make investments more attractive to interested external parties. At a meeting between India’s minister for commerce, Anand Sharma, and U. Khin Maung Lay, chairman of Myanmar trade council, an agreement was reached to aim at doubling the trade between the two countries by 2015 from $1.5 billion to $3 billion, and increase the list of tradable items. The additional strategic benefit that this opportunity offers to India is as a counterpoint to China’s headway into Southeast Asia; Chinese investments suffered a setback after the Myanmarese suspension of a Chinese hydro-electric project in the country.
Diplomatic relations are unpredictable at the best of times; they should, therefore, be grabbed when presented. The appropriate channel for cementing Indo-Myanmarese trade linkages at such a propitious time would be routes that are already in existence, and not those that are hoped to come online at some point in the future.
In addition, the China factor also indicates the assumed or endowed stewardship of Assam in matters of the Northeast. In terms of ministerial influence, Assam is observed to have the most clout at the Centre among the other Northeastern states. The recognition granted to Stilwell thus speaks also of internal politicking. Stilwell connects Ledo in Assam to Yunnan in China and just as Myanmar could act as a transit country for exchanges between the two Asian powerhouses, Arunachal Pradesh, through which Stilwell passes, could merely play the role of a trade conduit between Assam, Myanmar and China. Does this augur well that development meant for the entirety of the Northeast may be monopolised by Assam and leave the other states behind?
One of the reasons for the primacy placed on the Look-East Policy (LEP) is the mileage it provides to the Vision 2020 document, which is intended for the development of the Northeast region. This is to be brought about by establishing and consolidating linkages with the countries that lie in its immediate neighbourhood and serve as gateways to Southeast Asia. For this outcome, it is essential that Moreh-Tamu play a critical role, since border trade at this point is already in place. Procedures for border trade have been deemed complicated. In fact, Indians conducting cross-border businesses prefer to use sea routes from Kolkata, Mumbai and Singapore rather than across land borders in the Northeast to avoid tax irregularities. This, despite the signing of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and Myanmar, which is supposed to make certain that taxation occurs in the country where the company holds permanent residence. Rules therefore need simplification, and trade needs regularisation, to stem illegal exchanges and strengthen formal trade. INAV