By T P Sreenivasan
When External Affairs Minister S M Krishna and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and their high-level teams sat down, not on opposite sides of the table as customary, but intermixed around a table, on June 13, 2012, for the third round of their strategic dialogue, there was spring in the air, not blowing in from the Potomac, but from the distant Pacific Ocean. The issues that had bedeviled the bilateral relationship in the last two years were all there, but there was certain urgency about putting them behind and moving forward for larger objectives. The ripples that grew into waves in the South China Sea and the changing equations in Asia Pacific gave their parleys new content and a sense of purpose.
In the last two years, India-US relations had receded into the background, with no sign of the next big thing happening after the nuclear deal, which itself had run aground and US disappointment over nuclear trade and the fighter aircraft deal. India’s quest for strategic autonomy in nonalignment 2.0, which manifested itself in its stance in the UN Security Council had also irked the United States. On Iran, India did not deliver the goods that the US had expected. Afghanistan had slipped away from the bilateral agenda and each pursued its own objectives, with hardly any meeting of minds. The result was a sense of resignation to routine and claim that there were scores of working group meetings to keep the relations going. The two sides proclaimed eternal friendship with each other, but conceded that a strategic alliance was difficult to accomplish. India would never be an ally, but a friend, it was declared.
The wind suddenly changed direction in January this year, when the United States found it necessary to rebalance its forces in Asia Pacific and build relations with the countries of the region to counter the Chinese influence. “We recognise quite clearly that every country in Asia wants a better relationship with China, and we support that….It is a necessity that that the US and China work together in peace; that we compete, but that we compete in ways that bring prosperity and peace to Asia as a whole”’, said a US spokesperson at the end of January 2012. A new strategy to contain China was unveiled even as China sought to replace US led alliances with their own security structures. No doubt, after initial hesitations, the US began to see India as the “lynchpin” of its new security architecture and India became a doorway to the Pacific. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta made it clear that he was on a mission to recruit India as a partner in Asia Pacific, whatever may have been the irritants in the past.
The elaborate Joint Statement issued at the end of the strategic dialogue makes the context very clear. “The US and India have a shared vision of peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and the Pacific region and are committed to work together, and with others in the region, for the evolution of an open, balanced and inclusive architecture.” Such a firm assertion of the role of the two countries in the region is rare in India-US statements. What is more, Secretary Clinton welcomed India’s growing engagement in the Asia Pacific. The Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), an old Indian initiative, which had lost momentum, received a boost when the US sought to become a dialogue partner of the Association.
The US, once wary of Indian activism in Afghanistan for fear of Pakistan’s displeasure, declared its intention to seek new opportunities to intensify the efforts of the two countries for consultation, coordination and cooperation to promote a stable, democratic, united, sovereign and prosperous Afghanistan. India, in turn, welcomed the announcement of the Chicago Summit of NATO of progress in the security transition process, acknowledging the legitimacy of NATO operations in Afghanistan. The statement also favoured the elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. No better evidence was necessary of the disillusionment of the US of the role of Pakistan as an ally in Afghanistan and its desire to work with India.
The reference to defence relations was of particular importance. Instead of harping over the disappointment over the fighter aircraft contract, the statement celebrated the fact that India had awarded defence contracts worth USD 9 billion in recent years to US companies. It noted the many military exercises and exchanges in the last six years and reaffirmed their desire to strengthen defence cooperation through increased technology transfer. Defence Minister A K Antony had stressed to Secretary Panetta the need to transform the buyer-seller relationship into a partnership in technology and strategy. In New Delhi earlier, the US had conceded that India’s unwillingness to sign a couple of basic agreements relating to defence cooperation should not stand in the way of new defence deals.
Among the differences, which were pushed under the carpet was the nuclear liability issue, which had prevented nuclear trade between India and the United States so far. No mention was made to the obstacles to the licensing and site development work associated with construction of the new Westinghouse reactors in Gujarat, but they welcomed progress towards the full implementation of the nuclear deal. The need of the hour was to highlight points of convergence, not of divergence. An endless list of issues of agreement in diverse fields such as counter terrorism, intelligence, homeland security, cyber security, energy, climate change, education, development, trade, agriculture, science and technology, health and innovation and people-to-people ties found place in the Joint Statement as though the length of the document would add to the strategic partnership.
The spring in India-US relations, evident after the third round of the strategic dialogue, comes from the anxiety of the two countries to rebalance themselves in the face of Chinese assertiveness. Compulsions of security in Asia Pacific may well bring the two democracies closer together in the future. (The writer is former Ambassador of India and Governor for India of the IAEA Member, National Security Advisory Board, Member, India-UK Roundtable, Director General, Kerala International Centre, Thiruvananthapuram)