By Dawa Tshering
The Chinese territorial claim on Arunachal Pradesh has increasingly become an issue of grave concern for Indian foreign policy given China’s visible assertiveness on the issue in recent years. China’s growing influence in world politics, its closed political system, its economic robustness and its military modernization are creating apprehensions about the intentions and capabilities of China. On China’s part, its 2010 White Paper on National Defense reflects international tensions when it states that “International strategic competition centering on International order, comprehensive national strength and geopolitics has intensified.
Contradictions continue to surface between developed and developing countries and between traditional and emerging powers, while local conflicts and regional flashpoints are a recurrent theme. Major Powers are stepping up the realignment of their security and military strategies, accelerating military reform, and vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military technologies.
Most significantly, the White Paper notes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone massive modernization with a focus on joint operations and information warfare. The White Paper also states that border security is one of the most important tasks of the PLA and the Peoples’ Liberation Army Air-force (PLAAF) under the supervision of the State Council and Central Military Commission. The stress here is on joint operational and logistical training between the military, police and civilian actors in the border areas. It is important to note that border security, territorial integrity and social stability are the most recurring themes in the official announcements of the Chinese regime. Internal stability, territorial integrity, harmony and unity (including re-integration of historically claimed Chinese territories) is intricately woven throughout the Chinese National Papers on Defence.
Indian concerns about China’s military modernisation in Tibet which borders Arunachal Pradesh are also growing. China has upgraded its military presence in Tibet very close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Arunachal Pradesh by replacing its old liquid fuelled, nuclear capable CSS-3 intermediate range ballistic missile with “more advanced CSS-5 MRBMs”.
Intercontinental missiles such as the DF-31 and DF-31A with a range of 5,500 km to 8000 km have also been deployed by China at Delingha, north of Tibet. On the border with India, China has deployed 13 Border Defence Regiments amounting to around 300,000 PLA troops. Airfields have also been established at Hoping, Pangta and Kong Ka respectively. These are in addition to the existing six airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous Region for supporting fighter aircraft operations and to enhance the PLA’s airlift capability. Of critical value to China’s force structure in this regard is the PLA’s 23 Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs).
The RRFs have been considerably modernised to a hi-tech force equipped for a limited war in the Himalayas. The RRFs are on a 24 hour operational mode, and are trained to function in any environment. These units are composed of two group armies, nine divisions, three brigades, and seven regimental or battalion level units with an approximate strength of 400,000 personnel (This is inclusive of the Resolving Emergency Mobile Combat Forces (REMCF). All three divisions of the Chinese military namely, the Army, Navy and the Air Force, have their own RRF units. At present, there are six RRF divisions stationed at Chengdu very close to Tibet. Formed in the 1990s after the first Gulf War, the RRF’s main mission is to win or prevent highly intensive regional conflicts and enhance China’s military capabilities in a high tech environment using the latest in military technology.
Significantly, the RRFs possess the airlift capability to reach the India-China border in 48 hours. The six RRF divisions stationed at Chengdu are always in an operational readiness mode; capable of operating in all kinds of terrain. Of critical importance to India is the fact that the RRFs train in Southwest China (Yunnan), a terrain very similar to Arunachal Pradesh. The RRFs will form the first line of offence used by China to occupy key areas in Arunachal Pradesh and resist the forward movement of the Indian army if any future conflict occurs.
India has responded to this Chinese military build-up by taking a strategic decision in October 2011 to deploy the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has a flight range of 290 km, in the eastern sector to strengthen its defence posture vis-à-vis China. A five year expansion plan to induct 90,000 more troops and deploy four more divisions in the eastern sector is also underway. Already, there are 120,000 Indian troops stationed in the eastern sector, supported by two Sukhoi 30 MKI squadrons from Tezpur in Assam. In April 2012, India successfully tested the 5000 km range Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Agni V, from Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast. The Agni V can reach Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai. This kind of nuclear escalation “signalling” between two of the rising powers of Asia is not without its downsides.
First, China already possesses ICBM capabilities ranging from 5,500 km to 8,000 km. It’s Dongfeng 31 or the D- 31 is a solid fuel ICBM with a range of 8000 km. China also successfully test-fired its 14,000 km range Dongfeng-41 (D-41) ICBM in July 2012. It also possesses the JL-2 nuclear tipped ICBM with a range of 7000 km and can be launched from submarines. Secondly, this situation of a potential nuclear arms race could result in a “security dilemma”. Security dilemma by definition implies that when the first state arms itself, the second state fearing the first state’s armament, in turn arms itself. The first state then responds to the second state’s armament by further arming itself resulting in a vicious cycle of armament.
China’s territorial claim on Arunachal Pradesh also has great symbolic resonance for its legitimacy over Tibet. The 400- years old monastery in Tawang was the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama in the 17th century and is the second largest Tibetan monastery after Lhasa. It is plausible that the 14th Dalai Lama chooses his successor from the Tawang monastery. China also perceives that India makes it possible for the Dalai Lama to travel abroad, and his speeches around the world have kept the Tibetan issue alive and questioned Chinese legitimacy over Tibet. Besides this, Chinese suspicions were aroused when, following the rebellion in Tibet in 1959, the Chinese were
criticised by certain Indian leaders, and the mass media. China feared then and still fears now that India might itself become a base for the subversive activities of the Dalai Lama’s supporters. Consequently, China pursues an aggressive posture on Arunachal Pradesh to deter India’s so- called Tibet card. Most local academics and policy makers in Arunachal Pradesh argue that Chinese aggressiveness is increasing vis-à-vis Arunachal Pradesh due to its growing insecurity over Tibet. Indeed, the existing strong Tibetan culture especially in Tawang and the Upper Siang districts in Arunachal Pradesh provoke Chinese fears of a covert pan-Tibetan movement for independence from across the India-China border. INAV