By R G Lyngdoh
The situation in Garo Hills is a matter of grave concern and many experts have dissected and analysed it. Over the years, attempts have also been made to try and tackle the situation, but the problem at the ground level has only got worse. Having stayed in Garo Hills for over a decade, from the mid 80s to the late 90s, I have found the people to be friendly, simple, hardworking, God fearing, law abiding and very supportive of one another. I have no reason to believe that this basic characteristic of the people has changed in any way. Then why is it that today, a section of our opinion leaders are “of the opinion that whole or parts of the area are in a dangerous or disturbed condition such that the use of the Armed Forces in aid of civil powers is necessary”? (This is the definition of a disturbed area under AFSPA as quoted by Kong Patricia Mukhim in her article on Friday, 11 July 2014).
Till date I have not found any instances, throughout the world, where military initiatives have managed to foster a lasting peace. “Operation Birdie” in the Lyngngam area of West Khasi Hills in the early 2000s is an example of how military operations are a waste of time and resources. In fact, it is my firm belief that if the lakhs of crores of rupees that the Government of India had spent on security issues in the North East region, since the 1950s, been spent instead on building developmental infrastructure and human resources, the North East would have become a peaceful, economically viable region where the present problems would be non-existent and the people would be busy leading happy and productive lives. Unfortunately, for us, it was not done so.
In my opinion, the violence and insecurity in Garo Hills is just a symptom of the real problem. I do not believe that the Garo people have suddenly become fierce, militant and rebellious by nature. Therefore, I would say that it is actually only a section of the people of Garo Hills that have been forced to go against their basic peaceful nature in order to take up a life of violence and crime. What has prompted this unnatural behaviour? And, more importantly, why hasn’t the Garo community been able to rectify the situation for itself?
The problem is complex and multi-dimensional, with each dimension integrally connected to the next. The first issue, I feel, that has caused the problem, is the inability of the common youth to see a productive future for themselves. Firstly, as in other areas within the Northeast, they see a secure future for themselves only in government jobs. With the growth in population, and in eligible candidates, government jobs are no longer so easily available. The competition has become cut-throat, and interference by politicians has only made matters worse. It is no wonder then, that the average youth feels stymied by the apparent lack of opportunities for him. His frustration level rises and eventually gets itself expressed in the undesirable ways that we are experiencing today.
Connected to this frustration is the youth’s perception of militancy in its present form. On the one hand, getting a government job is almost impossible. On the other hand, he sees how militants enjoy the respect and “Robin Hood” status within society. This status is further enhanced by the militants’ quasi official status as “surrenderees”. It is no wonder then that the average youth aspires for that same respect and status. The fact that the youth is warmly welcomed into the militant’s fold makes it easier for him, or her, to make the decision.
The second issue is the confused identity of the average Garo youth. He is so used to quotas and reservations that he no longer sees himself as being at par with youths from other communities. He, therefore, feels threatened by them. Add to this the ethno-centric jingo of the average politician, who uses emotional planks to gain popularity, and he sees the influx of “outsiders” as the cause of all his problems. He is made to believe that the Government’s apparent hesitation to tackle the problem is because the Government is against him, and he is more than willing to start violently hitting out to get his own rights.
A third issue that perhaps adds fuel is the continuing operations against the militants. The anonymity that the militant enjoys makes it impossible for the Government to target him specifically. As a result, in its operations against militancy, the Government is forced to cast its net wide. Accordingly, for every three militants caught in the net, there are seven innocent youth who have to suffer. These slighted youth then become easy recruits to join the ranks of the militants, thereby compounding the problem.
A fourth issue that keeps the problem alive is the willingness of certain unscrupulous politicians to use militants to ensure their victory during elections. Seeing their proximity to the political leaders, government officials hesitate to take action against the militants. This enhances the influence and stature of the militants thereby making them even more attractive to the average unemployed youth.
Yet another factor that raises the social acceptability of the militants is the militants’ tactic to target the government’s officers in the field. By bullying them, the militants are able to scare away the minor government official from his, or her, area of work. In this manner, they are able to ensure that the government’s presence is not felt in the remote areas. Then, when the lack of monitoring makes the government workers delinquent in performing their duties, the militants step in to discipline these government functionaries to ensure that schools, health centres and government offices function properly. When they see these interventions, the rural villagers then begin to favour the militants over government officials, thereby further strengthening militancy.
Therefore, in order to tackle militancy in Garo Hills, it would perhaps be more effective if the Government was to engage in a psychological encounter with the militants rather than a physical one. In the early 2000s militancy was tamed in Khasi Hills by first cutting the umbilical cord that connected the militants to the community and then pressurising them to surrender, rather than going for a “ceasefire” agreement.
I would suggest that the Government should first ensure its benign presence is felt in the rural areas and erode the social status that the militants enjoy. Secondly, the Government should give businessmen and government officials a valid reason to refuse making payments to militants thereby effectively cutting off the militants’ source of finances. Thirdly, the Government should bring in traditional institutions, social and religious institutions, the media and even the relatives of the militants to help it fight militancy. This would make the community take ownership of the initiatives of the Government. Fourthly, the Government should gradually reduce the violent operations against militants in order to reduce the likelihood of innocents suffering. Lastly, the Government should entice individual militants to surrender en masse by making them an offer they would find difficult to refuse. Those that surrender can then be given a hero’s welcome and counselled and rehabilitated to join the mainstream.