By Kanwal Sibal
The situation in Afghanistan continues to be fragile politically, economically and militarily despite the formation of a national unity Government in Kabul and the US-Afghanistan Defence Security Agreement. The national unity Government averts the danger of sharpened ethnic divisions following accusations of electoral fraud in the presidential elections.
How much this Government is a product of an enlightened compromise by the political class in Afghanistan, and how much it is a result of US goading, can be debated. If the former, its longevity would be better assured, as it would signify an evolution of Afghan polity, with national sentiment beginning to override warlordism.
If the latter, its durability will be tested. The CEO’s position that Abdullah Abdullah holds is not provided for in the Afghan constitution and can lead to jurisdictional conflicts despite political agreements under pressure of circumstances.
The Afghanistan-US Defence Security Agreement (DSA) will enable residual US forces to remain in Afghanistan till the end of 2016, when, according to the calendar established by President Obama, US forces will withdraw fully. This implies the US should now have a stake in Afghanistan’s stability and security for the next two years or so. It also means the commitments made by the US and the international community to provide funding for Afghanistan’s economic development and its security forces should be honoured for the period ahead. The Afghan security forces are already facing a stepped up Taliban offensive, suffering about a 100 casualties a week. Like the Iraqi army they have been trained by the US, and like it they lack air cover, reconnaissance and intelligence means.
Despite the DSA, it appears US forces will not provide air support to the Afghan National Security Forces(ANSF), besides being reduced by half by end 2015 from a total of less than 10,000 troops at the end of 2014. Will the ANSF collapse the way the Iraqi army did in the face of ISIL’s offensive? The two situations may not be identical, but just as ISIL moved into Iraq from its bases in Syria and just as Iraq Sunnis, including those in the Iraqi army, joined the Islamic fighters rather than combating them, the Taliban could take control of parts of Afghanistan in the south and southeast from bases in Pakistan, with the support of the local population.
If the Sunni areas of Iraq did not reject the ideology of the ISIL, can one be certain the unappealing retrograde religious ideology of the Taliban will be rejected in the Pashtun areas? Of course, unlike in Iraq where the Maliki Government was Shia dominated and sectarian in outlook, the Pashtuns are integral to the power structure in Afghanistan, although this may not provide enough cushion against the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal is completed.
Pakistan’s strategic ambitions would be a key factor in this regard. Unlike in the case of Syria which has lost control over large parts of its territory, whose Government has been de-legitimised by the West and whose territory is being bombed by US forces in order to decimate the ISIL, not only has Pakistan’s support for the Taliban never been a really contentious issue with the US – no matter how much former Afghan president Karzai denounced Pakistan’s involvement in terrorism in Afghanistan – the US is engaging the Taliban as part of its withdrawal strategy.
Pakistan therefore has a freer hand in manipulating the Taliban to exert strategic control over Afghanistan, in large part to limit India’s role there and in Central Asia.
Pakistan’s declarations against a full Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the US’s precipitate withdrawal need not be taken at face value, as these are tactical.
Pakistan’s hostility towards India, the terror weapon it uses against India with relative western indulgence, its renewed aggressiveness over the Kashmir issue and its general willingness to take risks even when its internal problems have worsened, indicates the obsessions of its ruling class, which include Pakistan’s belief that it has the right to treat Afghanistan as its strategic backyard.
The economic challenges facing Afghanistan are formidable. It is rich in mineral resources, but extracting them requires massive investments, for which an environment of peace is necessary. Afghanistan can be a transit hub between Central Asia and South Asia for hydro-carbons, power and regional economic development that would also help contain religious extremism. The logic of its membership of SAARC and SCO participation favours this. Its agricultural potential is considerable, but developing it needs stable and peaceful internal conditions as well as access to regional markets.
India and China, at different levels, can help develop Afghanistan’s mineral resources and infrastructural connectivities, while providing markets for Central Asian gas and oil resources from which Afghanistan can benefit as a transit country. But these long-term prospects do not address Afghanistan’s challenge of shedding dependence on inevitably declining foreign assistance and developing its own revenue sources for sustained growth. As it is, GDP growth has declined from 14.4% in 2012 to 3.1% in 2013 and is likely to be around 3.5% in 2014 according to the World Bank. Since 1979 external interventions in Afghanistan have been destructive. Whether they can be constructive from now on remains uncertain.
The entire Islamic region from Pakistan westwards is in turmoil, with geo-political and sectarian interests of outside and regional powers at play. It is difficult to see how Afghanistan can be isolated from this dangerous reality.
(The writer is a former Foreign Secretary)