By Fabian Lyngdoh
Efforts have been made by the Central Government to make the Autonomous District Councils in the Sixth Schedule areas more efficient as instruments of democratic decentralization. The Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India sent the Draft Meghalaya Village Council Act, 2011 to the Government of Meghalaya in January, 2011 with a request that the Bill be considered for implementation. In May, 2011 the Ministry again sent a draft Law for enabling the State Election Commission to conduct elections to the Village Development Councils. These draft Bills were more or less in line with the constitution of the Panchayati Raj Institutions. The Government of Meghalaya too in August, 2011, proposed the establishment of the State Finance Commission. In response to this move by the Central and State Governments, the three ADCs of Meghalaya in a joint meeting on the 30th May, 2011, unanimously resolved to oppose these enactments as they are felt to be contrary to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule as well as to the prevailing traditional practices, customs and usages of the tribal communities of the State. The Central Government then brought out a comprehensive Bill for amendment of the Sixth Schedule and also to the Article 280 (bb) (c) of the Constitution with the intention to remove undemocratic elements from its provisions so that financial empowerment of the grass-roots governance institutions through provisions of the 73rd and 74th amendments could be materialized.
In response to this, the Executive Committee of the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council drafted its own Village Administration Bill, 2011 which was passed as the “The Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Village Administration) Bill, 2014”, on the 1st July, 2014. The Bill is said to empower the grass-roots governance institution in the form of the ‘dorbar-shnong’ by providing constitutional status so that direct funding would be available to the people at the grass-roots in the rural areas as well as in the urban areas through the District Council and the Hima. But as a concerned citizen I would like to point out that the Bill’s intention seems to be to restrict the powers of this democratic institution by empowering the hereditary institutions instead. As pointed out by Peter A. Dohkrut (ST January 8th, 2015), the Bill is based too much on sentiments and idealistic concepts which cannot be operative in terms of law, and which leans more towards preservation of undemocratic customs rather than removing undemocratic elements and ushering in a democratic transformation. The Bill proposes to protect tradition, but ironically ignores the existence of the dorbar-raid which is the basic and actual fundamental traditional authority.
Section 4(A) of the Bill provides: “In the case of a village falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Council where the customary practice of the Dorbar Shnong does not exist, the chief and his dorbar shall constitute the Village Development Council (VDC) in accordance with Section 13 of this Act. This Section has also a proviso which says that, “in this case, the duties, functions and responsibilities of the dorbar-shnong shall be discharged by the chief and his dorbar”. It is a known and accepted tradition that there are many villages in the Khasi Hills which are inhabited by non-Khasi tribes since time immemorial. These tribes have their own traditional village institutions in the model of the Khasi dorbar-shnong. Some tribes like the Karbis, Lalungs, Rabhas, etc., inhabiting Ri Bhoi District even have their own intermediate institutions like the Khasi dorbar-raid which are so far recognised by the society. It is for these kind of villages that the provisions of Section 4(A) are intended to be applied. The National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) vide its recommendation No.9.23 suggested constitutional provisions to safeguard the interests of minorities and micro minorities, and protection of their traditions. The Home Affairs Department Government of India also recommended that careful steps should be taken to devolve political powers to traditional political organisations, provided their traditional practices carried out in a modern world do not deny legitimate democratic rights to any section in their contemporary society. Hence this provision of the KHADC (Village Administration) Bill, 2014 is in direct contradiction to the democratic principles proposed by the Government of India.
Section 5 provides that, (viii) residential certificate to non-Khasis of India residing not less than 14 years requires the prior approval of the chief and the District Council; (xii) “N.O.C. for trading license and mortgage of land requires prior approval of the chief. This implies that the land in the village is the property of the chief. Indeed, the crux of the problem is that the question of territorial authority which was traditionally exercised by the dorbar-raid remains unresolved till now. The scope of this article does not permit a deliberation on it. The phrase “prior approval” in this section is vague. What would happen if a person acquires the prior approval of the chief but the dorbar-shnong refuses to grant the N.O.C.? The correct procedure is that the chief or the District Council should not grant any certificate or trading licence without the N.O.C. from the dorbar-shnong concerned. Section 5(xiv) provides that “the Village Dorbar should submit annual and periodic report and statement of audited accounts to the District Council through the chief for approval”. This provision is also vague. The dorbar-shnong would be bound to submit statement of account to the chief and the District Council only on the utilization of finances sanctioned by the chief or by the District Council. Should the dorbar-shnong submit financial statements to the chief and the District Council on matter of finances which they have not sanctioned?
Section 8 provides that, (i) “on the expiry of the term of rangbah-shnong, the election and nomination shall be conducted by the chief as per prevailing custom of the village, raid or elaka. All reports/proceedings of nomination or election of rangbah-shnong shall be reported by the chief to the District Council”; (ii) “if any dispute arises in connection with the election and nomination of rangbah-shnong and the village executive dorbar, such dispute shall be referred by the party or parties to the chief and his dorbar”. Majority of the dorbar-shnong today conduct the elections by themselves without any intervention by the raid or the hima. Why should this provision be unnecessarily brought in? And in case of dispute, the matter should be brought to the chief! Where is the traditional institution of the raid which is the basic authority?
Section 9 says that, (xiii) “the rangbah-shnong cannot enter into negotiation with any outside agency, organisation, or corporation or groups or individuals without prior approval and consent of the dorbar-shnong, the Elaka (chief) and the District Council”; (xiv) “the dorbar-shnong cannot issue N.O.C. to any company, or firm or society or organisation or individual or clan in matters concerning allotment of land or forest lands or any other village resources without prior approval and consent of the dorbar-shnong, the Elaka (chief) and the District Council”. Why should the consent of the chief and the District Council be required even for matters relating to society, organisation, individuals and clans? The consent of the general dorbar of the village would be sufficient in this regard.
Section 13 provides that (i) “every chief should ensure that every village shall constitute Village Development Council (VDC); (vii), “after the formation of the Village Development Council, the chief shall inform the District Council”. The Village Development Council is to be constituted by the people themselves, and not by the government or by the chiefs. A question arises as to how much development fund can the chief or the District Council sanction to every village? The village development council (VDC) has more to do with the implementation of the schemes financed by the State and the Central Governments, negligible amount sanctioned by the District Council, and nothing sanctioned by the chief. So let the people of the village constitute their own development councils without any superfluous interventions.
All these facts seem to indicate that the ADCs in Meghalaya have failed to function as instruments of democratic decentralization in the State. They have failed to inject dynamism for healthy social changes. The function of the District Council for which it was constituted is to protect tribal identity and at the same time to lead the tribe towards socio-economic development and meet the requirements of democratic principles such as individual rights, human security and gender equality. Have the Councils exercised their minds on these crucial issues yet?
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