By Rahul Saikia
During his recent swearing-in ceremony in Guwahati, the new chief minister Sarbananda Sonowal concluded his speech with the popular nationalist slogan ‘Jai Hind’. Also present on stage was the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who ended his own speech with the contrasting regionalist slogan ‘Jai Axom’. This piece of theatrical juxtaposition – the nationalist acknowledgment of regionalism (and vice-versa) – could either have been purely coincidental or cleverly orchestrated. Whatever the case, it does perhaps point to a larger process of negotiation between the BJP’s ‘Hindu nationalism’ and various forms of ‘Assamese nationalism’.
This article explores Assam’s contemporary political landscape as a larger negotiated space (of co-operation, compromise, and contestation) between the nationalist BJP and various regional political stakeholders. The first argument here is that these nationalist-and-regionalist negotiations could limit both the BJPs nationalist agenda (of the Hindutva variety) in Assam, even as they stifle various Assamese nationalisms (of the anti-mainland variety). To some extent, the aim here is to reassess certain concerns over the negotiating powers of local political parties vis-a-vis the central government. That said, the second argument here is that these contemporary negotiations do not necessarily represent an altogether new (or inspiring) political paradigm in the region.
The BJPs defeat in Bihar was partly attributed to its inability to project itself through a popular local alliance – which exacerbated its already authoritarian and divisive image. In contrast, the BJPs electoral strategy in Assam was to successfully negotiate the state’s complex demographics by variously acknowledging, attracting and accommodating a plethora of local stakeholders and their respective ethnic constituencies. These succesfull negotiations with local stakeholders include – the alliance with the AGP and the BPF (to secure Assamese Hindu and Bodo votes); the projection of Sarbananda Sonowal as chief minister (to project a pro-tribal stance); the poaching of Hemanta Biswa Sarma (to attract erstwhile Congress supporters); the decision to field a relatively large number of Muslim candidates (to shed the party’s communal image). For their part, the local political parties tapped into the BJPs formidable national image and resources to remove a common enemy in the state Congress government.
These electoral negotiations also seem to reflect a larger process of cultural negotiation between various nationalist-and-regionalist forces in the state. In a recent article, the senior journalist Shekhar Gupta observed how RSS workers in Assam have gradually managed to re-orient Assamese nationalism away from its erstwhile ‘anti-outsider agenda’ (against both Bengali Hindus and Muslims) towards a predominantly ‘anti-Muslim immigrant’ rhetoric. This in turn illustrates how the RSS has managed to partially subsume the Assamese nationalist movement into the larger fold of its Hindu nationalist agenda. In other cases however, it is the RSS which has been compelled to accept certain moderate aspects of Assamese Hindus – with the latter still remaining indifferent to Hindutva projects like beef politics and the Ram temple issue.
To some extent, these political and cultural negotiations suggest that Assam’s complex demographics could compel the BJP and the RSS to dilute its Hindu nationalist agenda (to the relief of liberals), even as local parties like the AGP and the BPF could use their alliance with the nationalist BJP to ward off the potential threat of radical Islam and illegal influx (to the relief of conservatives). Still, such a hypothetical balancing act is fraught with its own obvious communal dangers – as the potential growth of right-wing Hindutva could simply work to intensify the growth of radical Islam (and vice-versa) within the state.
Moving on, it should however be noted that these national-and-regional negotiations do not represent an entirely new political paradigm within the north-east. After all, successive Congress governments in Assam have similarly accommodated various regional movements (e.g. with the BPF and the ‘minority vote’). In a somewhat similar vein, one of Modi’s first post-electoral announcements in Assam was the granting of ST status to ‘Hill Bodos’ and ‘Plain Karbis’. That the BJP is pursuing a similar path of selective patronage illustrates how it can only realize a pan-Indian sense of political legitimacy by accommodating various regionalist aspirations. This perhaps explains the prime minister’s recent multicultural overtures – speaking Assamese, playing Khasi drums, saluting local football heroes – all in an attempt to publicly project himself as the benevolent and all embracing figure-head of the nation. In this regard, there is something about Narendra Modi’s savvy PR campaign which seems to echo Jawaharlal Nehru’s own erstwhile engagements with various regional cultures to secure the legitimacy of the Congress as ‘the’ pan-Indian party.
These similarities with the Congress suggest that the saffron party might gradually adopt a more pragmatic multi-cultural stance within the north-east (except perhaps with regards to one particular community). Supporters of the BJP will further insist that the party’s stated priorities – modest nationalism, economic growth, government efficiency, political decentralization – represent a superior political model compared to that followed by the Congress. At present however, there still seems to be one worrisome similarity between the two national parties – i.e. their shared tendency of selective political patronage and puppetry over local parties, politicians and movements. With numerous reports and rumours that the BJP is pursuing precisely such a strategy – of ‘winning over’ so called dissidents from rival political parties – it is difficult to claim otherwise (e.g. the recent Uttarkhand fiasco).
Citing these similarities between the Congress and the BJP, a young Shillong businessman and friend recently explained – ‘See it is all about buying and selling in the end. Before there was only one buyer [national party] and now there are two buyers…so basically nothing much has changed’. This political logic does not apply to all politicians. Still, the implication here is that the larger national parties routinely ‘poach’ (to use corporate terminology) those local politicians who eagerly ‘switch’ their own political loyalties in order to ensure continual central patronage and funding.
This particular form central patronage which disrupts elected state governments reveals the more depressing side of centre-state negotiations. On one level, it takes the sheen off the national parties and their loud public proclamations to foster and respect the political autonomy of the states. At the same time, it also reveals how some local politicians are willing to abandon their own political parties and local constituencies simply to ensure continued central patronage. Given its largely ‘informal’ and ‘top-down’ nature, it also is unlikely that this kind of central patronage extends beyond a small clique of local ministers, family members, local businessmen and party workers – thereby excluding the vast majority of common people.
These political trends strengthen the growing public perception that both the national and the local parties are more concerned with ‘staying in power’ than securing the welfare of the people. This in turn has led to renewed public calls for genuine grassroots mobilizations to represent various excluded sections of society (i.e. the remaining 80%). Some of these emerging grassroots movements therefore serve as important facilitators of public resistance and self-empowerment in the face of mounting government failures.
Given the power of the central government, it is often cited that local politicians find themselves compelled to blindly follow certain diktats coming out of New Delhi. Even if this is the case, these local politicians still command considerable local power and resources to pursue various strategies of economic development, social welfare, communal harmony and efficient governance within their respective constituencies. Whether they will actually puruse such locally relevant developmental strategies is entirely their own choice. Still, it is a choice which will not go unnoticed – either by the central government, their local constituencies and various grassroots movements.