By Ajay Patnaik
Within a month of Donald Trump assuming the Presidency of the US, there have been remarkable shifts in American policy towards Ukraine. What looked like a total US commitment to see the strategic defeat of Russia a few months ago, has now transformed into putting pressure on Ukraine to move towards a ceasefire and negotiate a peace deal. Suddenly, the new dispensation in America seems to be empathising with the Russian perspective and position on its conflict with Ukraine. The bulldozing of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office, pause in military aid to Ukraine and stopping intelligence sharing indicate that the US is strongly pushing for an early end to the war. Caught in this radical shift in the US position and meeting of American officials with their Russian counterparts in Riyadh and Istanbul, Ukraine has had to recognize this new reality and agree to the peace process without insisting on security guarantees. However, the story does not conclude here. There are many imponderables on the way to end the war.
The European powers have rallied together in support of Ukraine’s war efforts and have promised to continue the supply of military and financial aid. This may not be enough for Ukraine to regain its lost territories, let alone inflict a defeat on Russia. Still, such support in military and financial terms could prolong the conflict for some time at least.
Secondly, the US policy is not in favour of empowering Russia to the extent that it becomes a hegemonic power in Eurasia. The US since the end of the Cold War, even during days of bonhomie in the 1990s, never considered Russia as an equal and even treated it as a ‘defeated’ power. The fact that Moscow still had the largest nuclear arsenal and the capability to destroy the West has always bothered policy makers in Washington and the European capitals. As a result, the policy of containment continued even after the Cold War ended. In pursuit of this policy, the US/West expanded NATO eastward to Russia’s borders, changed regimes that were friendly with Russia and installed more anti-Russian and pro-Western governments, for example in Georgia and Ukraine. As Russia pushed back against such Western policies, the proxy States were encouraged to stay away from any effort to normalise relations with Moscow. The Minsk II agreement of 2025 and Istanbul talks of 2022 are examples of this.
The thinking that Russia has to be contained still persists in the West. Trump’s inclinations notwithstanding, he cannot probably go against the larger strategic goal of weakening Russia as a global power. He has even cautioned Russia with sanctions on banks and tariffs if the country does not agree to an immediate ceasefire.
However, Trumps pressure would be more effective with Ukraine than with Russia. Being a proxy State, Ukraine was totally dependent on Western military and financial aid, the bulk of which came from the US. Being a smaller country, it has experienced relatively more damage to its infrastructure, manpower and other resources. If the war lingers. further attrition is on the cards. So, America is actually doing Ukraine a favour by trying to stop this protracted war. Trump also pragmatically thinks that US financial resources could be put to better use domestically than in funding a war that Ukraine cannot win and Russia will not ultimately lose.
For Russia, the end of this conflict is desirable in many ways. It does not have an inexhaustible supply of men and materials to endlessly fight the war. At many levels sanctions are biting though not as much as the West desired. To escape the severity of sanctions, Russia has depended more on China, which may look beneficial now but in the long run it could stymie Russia’s power in Eurasia where China is already advancing rapidly with its economic heft. To escape from any potential Chinese economic grip, Russia needs to quickly end this possibility. This can be done by working to end the sanctions and resume trade and investment relations with Europe. Achieving that would depend on how soon a peace deal is signed with Ukraine. Now that the US is on board for a negotiated settlement the chances of peace are brighter.
Negotiations to end the war are not going to be easy. Both Ukraine and Russia would have their maximalist or extreme positions. Kyiv would demand the return of all areas under Russian control since 2014, including Crimea. Moscow would want complete control over Crimea and four other regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zhaporizhzhia) it had declared as part Russia after a referendum there in September 2022. Moscow at the moment does not have complete control of these territories. It would expect Kyiv to cede the territories to Russian sovereignty.
The other sticky point could be security guarantees. Russia wants Ukraine out of NATO in future. Given the US statements on this issue, NATO may not include Ukraine as a member for now. But the situation may change in future with new political dispensations in the US.
Given past experiences on NATO expansion despite assurances, Russia may not accept such a “commitment” at face value. It needs buffer zones to insulate itself from NATO reaching its frontiers, especially through its more than 1,900 km long border with Ukraine. Russia has tried this earlier, with two break-away regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) declaring independence after the Russia-Georgia war of 2008.
Russia has military personnel and equipment stationed there. Similarly, the Transnistria region that broke away from Moldova in the early 1990s is a proxy state for Moscow. Russia also has heavily militarised its exclave of Kaliningrad on the borders of Poland and Lithuania which are NATO members. The Russian controlled areas in Ukraine would serve the same purpose. Thus, Russia would not depend on assurances from the West about NATO expansion and ring fence itself with buffer zones to prevent any future security shock.
But what about security guarantees for Ukraine? The European powers have suggested that they could undertake a peacekeeping role after the war ends. The length of the border and the amounts of personnel and equipment this required would be enormous and expensive. Many European countries may be reluctant to commit so much human, military and financial capital for this. Russia would be opposed to any European/NATO role in peace-keeping since those powers have been party to the war in different ways. Instead, the option of having a UN or international peace-keeping mission may be considered.
On the whole, it may not be easy to achieve a lasting peace, though Trump looks to be in a hurry. The pressure on Ukraine would work, since it has been totally dependent on the West to fight the War. Russia on the other hand has been fighting practically on its own. It has been under massive sanctions since 2014. It can live with a few more. If Russia cannot have the advantages it has won after three years of war, it may not be prepared to conclude a peace deal.
(Dr. Ajay Patnaik is a retired Professor, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University). (Syndicate: The Billion Press) (e-mail: editorthebillionpress.org)