By Jaideep Saikia
In the shuttle-medley that is being played out in the east, between Bangladesh, Manipur and Myanmar, an important expanse in the region that has been momentarily lost to central players is North East India’s Arunachal Pradesh.
Arunachal Pradesh first came into view when Bob Khathing, and his able band of Assam Riflemen, “liberated” Tawang from Tibetan tax collectors in February 1951.
A McMahon Line which had internally embraced Tawang into India, perhaps one of the most important monastic (Gyelugpa sect) locations south of the Potala in Lhasa, was drawn in 1914 when British India’s Henry McMahon and Tibet’s Lonchen Shatra (China’s Ivan Chen left in a huff!) agreed on a line. Historians and cartographers have to unearth why a Line became a Bane.
And, then there was1962.
1962 has been the subject of many scholars and observers. The manner in which the Chinese responded to India’s “Forward Policy” has been documented by far too many. Few, however, have felt the need to introspect on the reasons for the declaration of the Chinese ceasefire and tactical retreat even as a Prime Minister’s heart went out to the people of Assam.
But the Chinese went back to a place (where they are still perched!) called the Thagla Ridge. The Chinese holding position almost approximates the Watershed Principle that McMahon drew. It would interest Indian Sino observers as to why that is the case! Have there ever been affirmations of belligerence and intrusion in the Kameng sector of Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese? Especially in the sub-sector of Namka-Chu?
One of the most important security challenges of modern India is the continuing impasse that characterises the India-China boundary.
It must also be comprehended that there are extra-regional powers that would like to keep India and China at loggerheads. It suits the purpose of such powers because China’s continued involvement with the border with India will not allow it to focus on its primary objectives including Taiwan.
But to hark back to history, there were attempts by China to equitably solve the boundary question by seeking to engineer an East-West Swap. The swap proposal was simply China retaining the territories—including Aksai Chin—in the west while India keeps everything it possesses in the east.
Most observers of the India-China boundary are of the opinion that such a “package proposal” that bases itself on the “as-is-where-is” line is the most pragmatic of solutions. Indeed, in the words of CV Ranganathan, India’s ambassador to China from 1987 to 1991, “the record of over five decades since India’s independence and China’s ‘liberation’ shows that the Indians and Chinese need to break out of a historical pattern—in which they have unilaterally projected their best hopes and their worst fears upon the mixed realities of the two countries” (Chapter on China in “External Affairs; Cross-Border Relations” Lotus Collection, 2003, General Editor: JN Dixit). To that end (and once again quoting Ranganathan) “both India and China would have to give up the high degree of self-righteousness that has marked the attitudes of both sides when they first confronted their differences in the later 50s of the last century.
It would also be of interest to the reader that top Chinese scholar and boundary expert, Wang Hongwei (who wrote an article in 2003 along with me titled “Giants at Peace”) had stated that “Non recovery of the entire southern slope (south of the McMahon Line: Author) could not really be considered “disgrace by selling out territory because China’s case for ownership of all that region was actually rather weak”.
However, the fact remains that the Chinese have been shifting their goalposts. The shift in Beijing’s position coincided with the Sumdorong Chu crisis. It seems that China “intended to underline its new, active claim in the east”.
Beijing had shifted goalposts which according to former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran — during a webinar on India-China boundary which was hosted by me on 30 August 2020 — was a clear departure from the earlier Chinese accommodative disposition. The reason for this departure was because of the enhanced strength that had come China’s way vis-a-vis India. One does not have to master rocket science to comprehend that China is willing to make concessions only when it perceives India to be in a relatively strong position, or when its own position is weak.
Therefore, the most important aspect that needs to be examined is (a) why the Chinese went back on the “package proposal”. This about-face needs serious examination along with an analysis of (b) what should henceforth be the Indian stand that would make Beijing revisit and once again offer the East-West Swap proposal?
In order to understand the above, it is important to closely study the reasons for which the 15 June 2020 intrusion in Galwan as well as the one in Yangtse on 9 December 2022 took place. I have made a careful study of both the incidents and have come to the conclusion that the intrusion in Galwan was primarily geared towards messaging (a) the United States that it could not use India as a countervail to China (b) caution India’s neighbours that India cannot be relied upon for their security and most importantly (c) to straitjacket India to its land commitments and from attempting to venture into the maritime domain that the People’s Republic wants to be their sole preserve. It is another matter that the Indian state (read: Indian armed forces) was able to call Beijing’s bluff and Galwan (notwithstanding the fact that certain military gains were “achieved” by China) did not translate into the larger strategic objectives that were sought.
In Yangtse the Chinese objective was different and had to be comprehended in light of the new Chinese “Land Border Law’ which came into effect from 1 January 2022. In my opinion, Beijing is constructing a “Second Great Wall of China” and was consolidating its land boundaries.
Walls, it must be realised, are built to keep away invaders. The Great Wall of China was constructed to stave off invasive attempts by nomadic hordes from the Eurasian Steppe. Therefore, the Great Wall of China—constructed from the 7th century BC—is for fortification. But it also implies that China would not “cross the wall” onto the other side. Indeed, therein lies the reason for the enactment of the “Land Border Law”. But in the bid to seek correct consolidation, China wants escarpments which would constitute its “Second Great Wall”. Yangtse is an eyesore for the PLA. The elevated position in which the Indian Army stands characterises an unacceptable platform for the fortification it seeks. Hence the attempt to occupy the spur on the night of 9 December 2022.
But the most important question before the Indian state is how to get China to resurrect its East-West Swap proposal. Serious analysis states that Beijing has to be forced into it by showcasing India’s prowess. However, the power differential between India and China is vast and it would not be possible for India to catch up with China’s economic or military might. The answer, therefore, is only in India creating deft moves that forces China to acknowledge India’s aggressive moves in global fora.
Quad, entering into military alliances with China’s adversaries and conducting exercises such as “Yudh Abhyas” or “Exercise Malabar” are good openings. The last Indo-US “Yudh Abhyas” conducted in Uttarakhand’s Auli in November 2022 rattled Beijing, and over two decades ago (2002), during my visit to China, Think Tank leaders in Beijing informed me that they were very uneasy about India aligning herself with countries such as the United States. Sensing an opening I had countered by querying as to why China was supporting India’s arch enemy, Pakistan. The answer was “Oh, never mind Pakistan. India and China should befriend each other on their own terms. Pakistan must not be allowed to come between two brothers”. It was obvious that India’s proximity with China’s rivals perturbs Beijing. The stratagem that India should adopt should, therefore, be to build a “position of strength” by exploiting China’s Achilles Heel, her nervousness as a result of India coming into alliances with its opponents. This is particularly so at this time when China braces herself for a Taiwan scenario. The “position of strength” that would be garnered should accompany “Track II” level overtures that must also forcefully suggest Chinese revisitation of the East-West Swap of 1960 and 1979.
It must become the “Indian Way” to advantage herself by arraying careful “chess pathways”. As the present Indian external affairs minister, S Jaishankar has written in his tour-de-force “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World”, “The India Way, especially now, would (should: my emphasis) be more of a shaper or decider rather than just be an abstainer”.
The Himalayan move in the chessboard would be able to engineer such a smart manoeuvre.
(The author India’s foremost strategist and bestselling author)