By Jaideep Saikia
The year 2025 might witness the “exit” of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isaac-Muivah)’s (NSCN (IM))general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah from the organisation. Indeed, morbid as that may sound, certain quarters seem to be impatiently awaiting the event.
Muivah’s “exit”, in my opinion, will have far reaching ramifications for the Naga Peace Process. Muivah is a true guerrilla. He was part of the first band of the “Naga army” that trekked through the inhospitable terrain of Myanmar and reached China’s Yunnan province along with “Brigadier” Thinoselie after a 97-day trek. He later went to Peking’s School of Diplomacy and was inculcated in the weighty nuances of scientific socialism and Maoism.
But Muivah was not greatly impressed by Chinese communism and he returned home to “Nagaland for Christ.” Indeed, the Nagas have waged war with India under Angami Zapu Phizo and Muivah’s leadership ( there were others including Isaac Chisi Swu and S.S. Khaplang). The belligerence from without ultimately ended in a ceasefire in 1997.
The ceasefire with the NSCN (IM) will complete 28 years on 1 August 2025 without any resolution in sight. Indeed, the only encouraging aspect of the ceasefire is the fact that the insurgents have not returned to the jungles, although there are reports that they are threatening to do so if the dialogue process does not reach an acceptable conclusion sooner than later.
However, the danger stems primarily from the manner in which the NSCN (IM) and their proxies are charting and carrying out a war of attrition in certain parts of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and Manipur.
The geo-political engineering that it is playing out in Manipur is ample evidence. It tantamounts to the time-tested NSCN (IM) approach of holding the state to ransom by creating economic blockades, and cutting the region from the rest of India. Indeed, this time around it seems to be making the most of the unrest in Manipur by aiding the insurgent groups of both denominations—Meitei and Kuki—who are warring against each other. The NSCN (IM) camps in Myanmar’s Somra Tracts are being used as a conduit for the insurgents from Sagaing Division and beyond to enter Manipur. In other words, the NSCN (IM), even as it awaits the second (and perhaps the final phase) in the Naga episode is amusing itself by inserting spokes in the Manipur imbroglio.
But as far as peace is considered, belligerent groups (and this aspect is certainly true for the NSCN (IM) invariably put forward conditions that may not be acceptable to the stronger party. But non-acceptable conditions are usually made only by way of bargaining chips with a comprehension that a climb-down to acceptable conditions would eventually take place, and ones which were actually intended by the belligerents.
The sincerity of both parties to resolve conflict by adhering to the principle of mutual accommodation and by prolonging the peace dividend when fighting ends is crucial at this stage. This is primarily because of not only the possibility that subterfuges may be engineered by hardliners among belligerents who feel that they will not be given their due in a post-settlement scenario, but also because of the presence of spoilers with vested interests.
Back channelling and secret parleys with a sincere mandate are best suited to navigate the process at such junctures: publicity normally results in devious objectives coming into play, derailing the political process in its infancy.
The ignominious manner in which the “Framework Agreement” of 2015 (which could have been the correct initiator for a comprehensive peace arrangement) and its scrivener had to be jettisoned is a clear example of an observable fact that could have been sensibly avoided! If secrecy was the key factor in the “Framework Agreement” motivation, it is not understood as to why there was so much tom-tomming of the “riddle wrapped up in an enigma,” when it was signed on 3 August 2015 in the presence of Narendra Modi.
In any event, a calibrated course correction exercise should now be undertaken, and in right earnest. It must closely study the activities that the NSCN (IM) is presently undertaking and active steps should be taken to ensure that India’s national security interests in a strategically positioned zone are not compromised.
But the most important question that is being asked in the context of the “impending” exit of Muivah would be, ‘what next?’ Muivah has not anointed anyone from the second rung of senior leadership to take over from him. The political commissar of the NSCN (IM), Anthony Shimray has already been elevated to the rank of army chief and although there have been certain rumblings about the dissonance between Shimray and other leaders of sundry groups due to the former’s “connection” with the Indian army, parleys take place in the darkest of places.
The fact of the matter is that Shimray ‘s Chinese connection had come to the fore in September 2010 when he was on an arms procurement mission from China. He was apprehended in Nepal and was incarcerated in Tihar Jail for six years. The arms deal with the Chinese and the apprehension of the political commissar came 13 years after the ceasefire with the NSCN(IM) in 1997. How did New Delhi permit such a travesty? It would interest readers that a similar “betrayal of faith” had taken place when the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) announced a unilateral ceasefire with New Delhi on October 8, 2004. But the NDFB chairman and the organisation’s 3rd Battalion continued to be billeted in Bangladesh and its chairman, Ranjan Daimary engineered the serial explosions across Assam at the behest of the ISI-DGFI. Later, the NDFB split into two and Ranjan Daimary, who was handed over to India by Sheikh Hasina, is currently undergoing life-imprisonment for his heinous crime which left over 100 innocent deaths in the course of a single day. But, as stated earlier, “parleys in secrecy” are a time-tested method, especially for the Indian state. In other words, neither Anthony Shimray nor Ranjan Daimary want to be behind bars forever. If the price is to be paid for freedom then one would suppose that ideology and everything “noble” in the lexicon of compromise will certainly come into play. It was not for nothing that the Kautilyan prescription of Saam (reconciliation), Daam (monetary inducement), Dand (punishment) and Bhed (division) continue to be part of the “Great Indian War Book!”
But to return to Nagaland, it would, in all probability, be VS Atem who would take over from Muivah as the general secretary of the NSCN(IM). But there is certainly going to be a war of succession after Muivah’s “exit” for leadership of the parent NSCN (IM).
A split has already taken place with Ikato Swu, Isaac Chisi Swu’s son deciding to join the Nagaland insurgents billeted in Myanmar’s Sagaing Division (primarily in the Somra Tracts) in order to “carry forward the Nagaland struggle”.
My last visit to the Naga dominated areas of Manipur revealed that Atem is clearly the frontrunner with a majority of the Manipuri Nagas backing him. However, since there is no love lost between the Nagas of present day territory of Nagaland and their brethren in Manipur, there would certainly be a jostle of sorts which, as earlier stated has resulted in a split of the NSCN (IM).
The problem with New Delhi is that it feels it knows everything sitting in Raisina Road. I have been writing and lecturing that there is a “clear” and growing schism between the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur who control the NSCN (IM) and the Nagas of present day Nagaland territory. The fact that Ikato Swu, a Sumi Naga, has thrown a spanner into the Nagaland Peace Process should have been anticipated by the Indian state. But they just don’t want to learn!
In 2023, I visited Nagaland to deliver lectures to the students of the colleges of Kohima. A post lecture interaction show-cased the fact that almost all the students of the present day territory of Nagaland are content with what they have. Although a separate flag and a separate constitution continue to be debated (I am certainly against a separate constitution for the Nagas!), the interaction with the students of the Kohima colleges seem to indicate that they are not interested in the inclusion of the Hill areas of Manipur into the present Nagaland. Indeed, they are quite happy with a special relationship with India and, as is evident, they view Delhi as their preferred destination.
Long ago, a writer surmised about “Hanoi being closer to the region than Delhi.” But it is a well-established fact that such irresponsible pronouncements have no basis. There is neither physical or emotional proximity between Hanoi and India’s North East. The geography of the present is mandated by a variety of factors. That the gates to Myanmar and Bangladesh are shut to the North-Easterner is witness to this obtrusive fact.
The North East’s fortunes are inextricably intertwined with that of India’s nation building exercise that Narendra Modi and Amit Shah are presently attempting to engineer. The North East has no future without New Delhi. It is best that the stragglers among the rag-tag belligerent groups in Manipur and Nagaland realise this as the inevitable reality sooner than later.
(Jaideep Saikia is India’s foremost strategist and Bestselling Author)