Unintended implications of Operation Sindoor
Dr. Salikyu Sangtam
In the early hours of May 7, 2025, the Union Ministry of Defence announced that India had launched Operation Sindoor, a response to the 22nd April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack that killed 26 tourists inside India Administered Kashmir. The operation, the Ministry of Defence mentioned, is aimed at “hitting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed”. It is important to add here that no Pakistan military facilities were targeted. The aftermath of the operation led to a steady escalation of attacks between India and Pakistan. The constant military escalation between the two sides was brought to an end just as rapidly as the operation had started. On the evening of 10th May 2025, India and Pakistan agreed on a “full and immediate ceasefire” to the escalating confrontation following India’s Operation Sindoor on May 7, 2025.
Following the ceasefire between these two antagonists, one of India’s foremost geo-strategists, Prof. Brahma Chellaney from the Center for Policy Research, termed it as India “snatching defeat from jaws of victory”. Now, what do we make of such a virulent remark? More importantly, Prof. Chellaney’s comments direct us to question the foundational basis of the whole operation. This foundational basis of the operation is, perhaps, based on two goals aimed specifically at two different sets of audiences. The first goal and the first set of audience the operation was intended for was the government of Pakistan and the terrorist groups it sponsored (such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen). By destroying the terrorists’ training facilities in nine different locations within Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), India sent a message to Islamabad that if it cannot handle such groups, New Delhi will hunt the terrorists even inside Pakistan’s territory. And to the terrorists, New Delhi’s message was to show that India can reach them even inside their assumed haven.
The second goal and the second set of audience are perhaps the most vital elements and it is also here that the cracks in the whole framework of the operation begin to emerge. It is here that we begin to see murky intentions behind goals that should not have been part of the force calculus of Operation Sindoor. The second goal was, with high plausibility, political, i.e., for electoral gains for the coming state general election cycle in Bihar, West Bengal, Tamil Naidu, Pondicherry, Assam, and Kerala. And the second set of audience the operation was intended for was the Indian electoral voters. What is clear as daylight, based on how the situation is rapidly panning out, is that this specific goal and the specifically targeted audience superseded all other military calculus and considerations. India’s foreign secretary in his press briefing immediately following the launching of Operation Sindoor mentions that India’s response is “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible.” This statement itself is a vivid indication from the start that the operation is limited in its scope and aim, i.e., “measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible.” Indeed, no military structures were targeted, which adds credence to the “measured (and) non-escalatory” part of the briefing.
Add to this are the images on big billboards and social media depicting India’s Prime Minister in Indian Air Force (IAF) jumpers with fighter jet behind him. Now, where are the Indian soldiers and Air Force that are at the forefront of the actual operations in the depictions? If there should be any valourizing, then our soldiers and air force should be the ones, who selflessly defend the country, on the billboards and social media, not the elected officials. This is another overwhelming indication of how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is spinning an important military operation into a political and electoral play for its electoral advantage.
These considerations, i.e., the second goal and the second set of target audience, superseded all other military calculations. That is why, one gets the indication that no thoughts were spent on planning out the rest of the operation after the initial strikes on nine terrorist locations. This may be perhaps why the ongoing speculations about the downing of the Indian Air Force Rafale jet are gaining more credence. Some of the most reputable news agencies such as the Telegraph (UK), the Washington Post, Reuters, Le Monde (France), and France 24 have already brought out pieces on the downing of an Indian Air Force (IAF) Rafale jet by a Chinese supplied J10C Pakistan jet fighter. As stated in Le Monde on May 8, 2025, “New Delhi has begun to acknowledge the loss of several fighter jets during “Operation Sindoor”.
If military calculus had taken precedence over trifle electoral considerations, then proper military planning concerning the bombing of the terrorist camps, countering Pakistan’s response after the attack on the terrorist facilities, attaining full knowledge about Pakistan’s air radar and defense systems, the quality of attack jet fighters, the range and capabilities of Pakistan’s fighter jets and missile systems, history of Pakistan’s fighter jets performance in the past 15-20 years, and what kinds of war games Pakistan’s air force have participated in recent years, among numerous other considerations would have been deliberated. But in the face of mounting evidence, we are brought to accept a compelling conjecture that military calculations were not given due precedence – that eventually led to the downing of the IAF Rafale jet fighter. If the military was given full rein over the military operations, then they would have studied all of Pakistan’s fighter jets, weaponry, radar systems, air defense system, response time, “kill chain”, and other capabilities. This way, we could have avoided such an international embarrassment. But, Alas! party interests, elections, and votes took precedence over the country’s dignity and honour that is attached to military victory. More concerning is that the downing of the IAF Rafale inadvertently exposed a major weakness in India’s armory. What’s more disturbing is that this weakness is in one of India’s most elite armed branches, the IAF.
Because party interests, electoral votes, and election cycle considerations superseded all other considerations, the civilian government that commands the armed branches implicitly and deliberately restrained the operational planning. That is because the main goal of this operation was to provide sensationalism to the intended Indian voters, who are the targeted audience. The Indian mainstream media, who rely on government advertisements for their revenue, jumped on the government’s bandwagon and, as usual, succeeded in crowding out and out-voicing in their loudness all other rational deliberation and sane discussions. The sensationalism it managed to produce flooded the media space with a plethora of misinformation such as attacks on Karachi, Islamabad, and so forth. Claims too outlandish, yet a messaging technique that has been the ‘standard operating procedure’ to influence average Indian voters because of its effectiveness, despite its melodramatic elements, in the past decades.
In the final analysis, what ultimately matters for the present government is not what the international community thinks, but what average Indian voters think of this operation. Whether the Indian military weaknesses exposed in this operation are of concern is not important to the BJP government, what matters for them is that Operation Sindoor, an emotionally charged term used to galvanize the emotions of Indians, succeeded in influencing the voters for the upcoming state general election cycle in the vital states of Bihar, Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Naidu, and Kerala. As long as the voters have been influenced and brought under the information bubble of the BJP, the ruling party will internally deem Operation Sindoor as a success.
Peeking from this lens, Prof. Chellaney’s remark about India “snatching defeat from jaws of victory” seems misplaced since war never was part of Operation Sindoor. We can only speak of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ in the context of ‘war’. One can sense an air of frustration on the part of Chellaney because, like many other Indians, we all were led to believe by the rhetoric making-machinery (such as the Indian Mainstream media and WhatsApp university) that India will comprehensively teach Pakistan and terrorists a lesson, not knowing that such saber-rattling jingoisms were distractions for another more sinister goal of attaining electoral advantage. Has this operation made India more formative and credible or weak and unreliable, only time will tell.
Note on Author: Dr. Salikyu Sangtam is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tetso College (Nagaland).