By Nilova Roy Chaudhury
A month after the military engagement between India and Pakistan ceased appears a good time to ask whether the objectives Operation Sindoor aimed to meet have been achieved. The Indian government’s equivocation on whether and, indeed, if, the Donald Trump-led US administration helped to broker that cease-fire has left the issue of how, why and what exactly happened to stop the ‘near war’ situation dangling.
Soon after the ghastly terror attack on tourists in Pahalgam, India’s clearly stated objective for launching ‘Operation Sindoor’ was to attack and destroy terrorist bases and infrastructure inside Pakistan. A total of nine such locations were targeted and considerable damage inflicted on buildings and the personnel in them who, clearly, had the support of the Pakistani state, which has over the past few decades formalised the use of terror as an instrument of its foreign policy, particularly against India.
Unfortunately for India, the narrative which played out after those strikes, especially across the western world, was of a belligerent India attacking civilian targets inside Pakistan. India also lost some of its strike aircraft in Pakistan’s counter-attack, as hostilities escalated to a ‘near war-like situation’ between the nuclear-armed neighbours.
As the theatre of the fireworks in the night skies shifted from news studios into homes, the Indian government, realising the critical nature of the perception of these events, decided to mount detailed official-military briefings, with the sober Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri leading the official briefing and two lady officers, from the Army and the Air Force, Col. Sofiya Qureishi and Wing Cdr. Vyomika Singh, providing details of the military operations undertaken. This injection of realism into the theatre of speculation helped to restore some credibility in the proceedings, despite the bypassing of questions.
However, when US President Donald Trump, on his social media feed, announced that the India – Pakistan military engagement would cease, to allow for dialogue, the Indian government stated that there would be a cessation of hostilities, but would not confirm the role of the United States in bringing an end to the violence. India categorically stated that any dialogue would be between India and Pakistan and, as is its traditional position, no third party mediation would be involved. No dates for any impending dialogue appeared imminent.
So whether India achieved what it set out to do, in terms of eliminating the threat from groups of state – sponsored terrorists in Pakistan, is unclear. What is clear is that the message it sent out, that terrorist attacks on its citizens would be countered militarily, appears to have removed the focus from the terrorist acts and brought back equivalence in the India-Pakistan relationship.
The Indian government’s prevarication around circumstances in which it agreed to the cease-fire, and the losses it incurred in the hostilities, has seen questions raised at international forums and a re-hyphenation, globally, of the India-Pakistan equation.
Having largely succeeded, since the 26/11/2008 outrage by Pakistan in Mumbai, to de-hyphenate the bilateral relationship, Operation Sindoor has revived the India – Pakistan equation, on par, despite the vast economic and developmental differences between the two countries.
Having taken on India militarily, Pakistan found itself back as the cynosure of global attention. Islamabad received its due tranche of IMF aid and elevated its Army chief, Asif Munir, widely seen in India as the perpetrator of the Pahalgam outrage and coordinator of Pakistan’s military response, to the rank of Field Marshall only the second in Pakistan’s history. Additionally, a key US military commander has lauded Pakistan as a pillar of cooperation in the war against terrorism.
Forced onto the back foot and finding itself rather isolated globally, New Delhi opted to send groups of its parliamentarians to 33 countries to explain that India, and not Pakistan, was the victim of terrorism. However, given the level and nature of the interlocutors they encountered and the fact that Pakistan, in its position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), has found itself in key anti-terrorism committees, assuming the Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee and Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, the optics surrounding India’s outreach does not appear to have been successful.
Within India, a special session of parliament was not convened to lay out the details provided to foreign interlocutors for the domestic audience, among whom many voices have even questioned why the government accepted the cease-fire, when it was ahead militarily.
Similarly, it was at a forum abroad that India’s chief of defence staff (CDS), Gen. Anil Chauhan, disclosed that India had indeed suffered reverses and lost aircraft on the first day of the operation. He also said the Indian armed forces “remedied” and “rectified” their strategy thereafter and emerged on top after causing substantial damage to Pakistan’s military assets.
In sum, while there is no doubt that the Indian armed forces emerged ahead of the military engagement and got a chance to test their battle-readiness in the modern theatre of war, in terms of perception, certainly, Operation Sindoor did not quite achieve what it set out to do.
The global view has seen India moving from being a credible counter to China to returning to a form of equivalence or a re-hyphenation with Pakistan. Responding to terrorist attacks in India with retaliatory military attacks on targets within Pakistan has assumed a predictability that allowed Islamabad to prepare accordingly and put up a substantial fight back. The issue of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir remains unresolved, despite rhetoric.
The absence of any forms of engagement with Pakistan other than military has narrowed India’s options substantially. As a sovereign state, Pakistan cannot be seen to nor will it bow to coercive tactics. The current Indian establishment’s perennially punitive approach to Pakistan and efforts to humiliate it by making it an object of domestic ridicule has not brought any dividends.
What Operation Sindoor has done is to clearly show up the need for detailed re-calibration of its Pakistan strategy if India wants to regain a semblance of the global authority it aims to wield.