By Dr Alex Waterman
Jaideep Saikia’s proposal to reframe the “Line of Actual Control” (LAC) as a “Line of Amity” was first put forward in a Track II dialogue in August 2014, emerging from a series of visits to the boundary, perusal of primary sources, and interviews with Indian Army commanders operating in the sector. The core premise is an acknowledgement that neither India nor China is going to cede ground. Instead, Saikia proposed a semantic reframing—replacing the belligerent-sounding “Control” with “Amity”—not to alter legal boundaries or even necessarily shift de facto realities on the ground, but to cultivate a more accommodating mindset and soften entrenched perceptions. This reframing could offer a way to change the narrative around the border, paving the way for future leaders to engage constructively while possibly minimising the baggage from previous hostilities.
Saikia revived this idea during a high-profile webinar on 30 August 2020, titled “India–China Boundary: Eye to the Eastern Sector”, convened against the fraught backdrop of the Galwan Valley clashes and simmering border tensions. The webinar included myself among 21 distinguished participants—former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, ex-Home Secretary G.K. Pillai, Lt. Gens. Mukherjee, Sharma and Ahuja, Myra MacDonald and Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, among others.
Perhaps a result of the then-ongoing clashes, the concept was met with widespread critique and robust debate. One participant opened the proceedings by arguing that a Line of Amity would amount to leaving India vulnerable to Chinese exploitation, such was the deficit in trust between the two parties. Others questioned what another “line” would offer in an already contested boundary environment. Indeed, even I myself, while very sympathetic to the power of reframing narratives such as the Line of Amity, wondered how such a concept could be employed at that specific point in time, such was the apparent intractability of the territorial disputes between the two parties. Others focused on the importance of building national consensus for any future spirit of accommodation with China when the time came. Others still questioned the relevance of thinking about the India-China border dynamic through the prism of fixed lines in the age of drones and satellites, lending support to the notion of a Line of Amity that moved beyond conventional thinking about borders.
Yet while the webinar was held during the height of recent India-China tensions, the webinar did present a really valuable opportunity to workshop the concept; in Jaideep’s thinking, later disclosed to me, if an “academic breakthrough” could be conceived during the height of tensions, then the workshopped concept could then flourish when and indeed contribute to a “diplomatic breakthrough” in better times. This insight is quite rare in strategic communities, which tend to think reactively rather than proactively. This was reflective of Saikia’s deep and long-term engagement with the ground realities along India’s Eastern Sector boundaries with China.
Fast forward to the present day and there appears to be such an opening for improving relations. In October 2024, the two countries agreed to disengage and restore patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control. Meanwhile, India’s relations with the U.S. under the Trump administration have soured over trade relations among other issues. In that context, even while China remains a strategic competitor and will continue to do so, India’s desire to retain strategic autonomy and its preference for a multipolar order gives it a degree of flexibility that never completely ruled out the prospect of at least some degree of India-China rapprochement. As both countries increasingly see value in at least managing their strategic competition and increasing cooperation where possible, the Line of Amity could represent one such tool to manage this competition and create the conditions for cooperation.
The relevance of Saikia’s “Line of Amity” thus appears to be rising once more, and yet as an outside observer, I was rather surprised that Saikia’s concept had not been explicitly referenced and recognised in the public commentary on this moment of India-China rapprochement. If India’s foremost priority is to maintain strategic autonomy in a fractious multipolar world, its policymakers would do well to recognise and engage with Saikia’s insights. This could include bringing Saikia and the Line of Amity into Track II and Track 1.5 discussions, by facilitating joint India-China academic dialogues on the matter, or by using strategic simulations to explore the peacebuilding potential of translating the concept into Line of Amity initiatives on the ground. Working with Saikia on these issues would ensure India is equipped with the diplomatic toolkit to thrive in this increasingly challenging multipolar world.
(Dr Alex Waterman teaches Peace Studies and International Development in the University of Bradford, United Kingdom)