By Lt Gen (Dr) Shokin Chauhan & Jaideep Saikia
The apprehension of an American named Matthew Aaron VanDyke—known for operating as a “mercenary” in strife-torn countries such as Libya, Syria and Ukraine—and six Ukrainians by the NIA is an upsetting development. It is particularly alarming because the seven persons entered, travelled and operated undetected for over three months in one of India’s (and abutting Myanmar’s) most sensitive conflict zones.
VanDyke is the founder of the “Sons of Liberty International” a United States 501(c)(3) outfit that provides military training, advise and supplies to forces fighting against authoritarian regimes and terrorists. His “illustrious” career which included the fact that he was a “Prisoner of War” in Libya while fighting alongside the rebels battling Muammar Gaddafi, and that he featured in a 2014 documentary film titled Point and Shoot about his days in Libya should have been known to the Indian intelligence. But his unrestrained entry into India in December 2025 suggests that it is not the case.
The unearthing of the plot, albeit a little late in the day, has once brought into shrill focus the intense susceptibilities in India’s internal intelligence.
L’affaire VanDyke and his “soldiers of fortunes” is a classic textbook instance of a “grey zone” intelligence failure, where anti-India elements were able to exploit the breach between lawful entry and unlawful activity.
A rerun of the manner in which the subterfuges happened takes one back to the staggered entry of the seven persons into India. The Indian immigration—manned by Intelligence Bureau personnel—did not “red flag” their entry into the country, perhaps because there was no reason to do so. Besides, it has been given to be understood that they were holding valid tourist visas and entered India on separate occasions, and separate destinations. However, the rub comes into play when it came to their entering Mizoram reportedly via Guwahati without a Protected Area Permit, and not registering within 24 hours of their arrival with the Foreigners Registration Office which is mandatory for all foreign nationals. Despite these violations, their presence did not initiate any law-enforcement response.
To be sure, the paradox lies in the fact that the 510-km India–Myanmar border in Mizoram is largely unfenced in order to accommodate the Free Movement Regime. The international border is with Myanmar’s Chin State and it runs along six districts of Mizoram, namely Champhai, Siaha, Lawngtlai, Hnahthial, Saitual, and Serchhip. In all likelihood, VanDyke’s group exploited these clandestine tribal transit routes, which may be occasionally monitored for entry-exit of contraband, but not fortified to detect high-tech “war tourists.”
Finally, detection occurred at airports in Kolkata, Delhi and Lucknow—the most unyielding points in the security grid—rather than the fluid land borders. This suggests that their movements were completely in the dark until the end of the three-month window period which the “dogs of war” needed to train Myanmar’s Ethnic Armed Organisations (and possibly the Kuki insurgent groups operating in Manipur) in sophisticated drone assembly and Electronic Warfare.
The long and short of the vicious cycle is that the Indian internal intelligence was able to track them down only after their mission to impart knowledge to their consumers was successfully completed. Indeed, a stray report seems to suggest that it was the Russians who tipped-off the Indian intelligence which led to the arrests. If it is indeed so, then it suggests that India’s domestic “eyes and ears” completely failed to independently detect a group of seven foreign military veterans making their way through a highly militarised zone. Indeed, observers of the event have pointed to the gross failure of the Intelligence Bureau. The ongoing ethnic unrest in Manipur and the volatile situation in Myanmar, they maintain, should have ordained a high order vigilance by the law-enforcement agencies. The entry of a known international mercenary under such circumstances makes the plot even more glaring.
At a deeper level, the incident signals a shift in the very nature of insurgency in India’s North East. The involvement of foreign veterans, particularly those exposed to modern battlefields like Ukraine, introduces the risk of advanced tactical knowledge entering local insurgent ecosystems. This includes the potential adoption of drone warfare, decentralised operations, improvised combat innovations and developments that could significantly alter the security landscape. Beyond immediate tactical threats, the presence of such actors’ risk internationalising local conflicts, opening pathways for external funding, influence, and strategic complications. What emerges, therefore, is not merely an internal security concern but a hybrid threat, where local grievances intersect with global conflict dynamics, demanding a far more coordinated, anticipatory, and robust response from the Indian state.
The manner of occurrence that jeopardised Indian security cannot be written off as a one-off breach or even a dramatic intelligence fiasco. It was a measured, crusted collapse of the system. A sequence of trivial, independently manageable security lapses—spanning immigration, cross-country movement, faux pas in restricted-area regulations—came clinically together to allow the anti-India foreign operatives to move, function, and (almost) depart with no interference whatsoever. The period in question was from the onset of December 2025 until their custody on 13 March 2026. Indeed, one of the most critical questions that needs to be raised is as to why did an intervention occur only at the end of the cycle—after, as aforesaid, alleged training and capability transfer had already been imparted—rather than at an earlier stage where tactical disruption might have been possible?
These are not procedural gaps that can be dismissed as mere organisational oversights. They raise serious issues pertaining to India’s national security: the integrity of India’s North East, the possibility of spillover from Myanmar’s ongoing conflict into the region, and the disturbing prospect that external actors may be exploiting the country’s systemic feebleness in ways that can have serious security ramifications for the nation. In fact, this column expresses its concern about whether there are other VanDykes on the lurk, not only in the trouble-torn sectors of the Indo-Myanmar border, but elsewhere in India. Indeed, one of the authors (Jaideep Saikia) has been circumspect about the manner in which certain overground think tanks in India have been, of late, collaborating with foreign countries with a view to the North East. It is his considered view that bypassing New Delhi in order to “reach out” to the North East directly is not desirable.
The episode necessitates an immediate course correction exercise. It is hoped that the competent authorities in New Delhi are listening and are seriously contemplating a comprehensive overhaul of the agencies that oversee the nation’s security. Such serious security gaffes are unacceptable.
(Lt Gen (Dr) Shokin Chauhan is a former Director General, Assam Rifles and Chairman, Ceasefire Monitoring Group. Jaideep Saikia is a celebrated Conflict Theorist and Bestselling Author. He has recently been selected as Member, Counterterrorism Advisory Board, Homeland Security Today, George Mason University, USA)
