By Anirudh Prakash
Fighting a war on two fronts is taxing for most armies. In the early modern European wars, this was rather more common. Fronts shifted as did alliances. Wars of this era usually became attritional wars and ground on till man and material resources on either or all sides depleted.
Napoleon Bonaparte true to his military genius had a masterful plan to invade the British isles from diagonal extremities; he was compromised by the French navy that was poorly officered compared to Britain’s that had renowned men like Horatio Nelson. Technically, Napoleon’s plan constituted an attack on two fronts; its failure marked the point of decline for Napoleon’s ambition to rule over Europe.
During both world wars, Central Powers and Axis Germany fought on two fronts. Till the allied powers did not coordinate their action, this was advantageous to Kaiser’s armies. Moreover, the German High Command had made excellent provisions to rotate and replenish troops and munitions round the radials and cross country. In contrast, it was telling that the absence of functional railways especially along the front made the Tsar’s offensive so poor, which the Revolution eventually killed off. But once the Allied Powers could coordinate their action, including along the Italian “joke” front, the German High Command was put to serious trouble.
In World War II, the technical brilliance of the German land forces, the Heer, and the unpreparedness of the West and the Soviet Union to the blitzkrieg tactics perfected by the high command, permitted Adolf Hitler’s forces a free run of Europe. In the west, where the Great War had slogged on for years across pestilential trenches, the active fighting was over within weeks. Equally, the Wehrmacht had an easy run on the Eastern Front until the killer snows of Russia froze the advance. From there, the great Russian counter-offensive commenced.
In some ways, out of the big wars, and adjusting for contemporaneity, World War II presents an interesting model for the study of two front attacks. The two fronts did not spring up simultaneously. Both Hitler and Joseph Stalin played for time with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Hitler’s big handicaps, however, proved to be absence of grand strategy (gaining Lebensraum for East Europe’s dispersed Germans wasn’t one) and game-changing naval forces. Napoleon, among other things, was also let down by his navy. Finally, to Hitler’s disappointment, Japan did not go to war with the Soviet Union, which would have opened a debilitating second front for Stalin, with no surety of victory. In 1905, the Japanese had defeated the Russians, creating conditions for the 1917 Revolution.
The two-front war threat to India from China and Pakistan is substantially different from that faced by Axis Germany, which in fact provoked the war. The provocateurs in the present case would be Pakistan or China or simultaneously both. But the lessons from the twofront attack on Germany back then may still be applied to the present case with some justification. Without getting into actual war-gaming, though, it might be more appropriate to address the broad issues. All three state actors in this hostile drama are nuclear powers. One of them is in fact a great power. What ought India to do then faced with a credible two front war threat?
At the recent conference of military commanders, presided over by prime minister Narendra Modi, surely discussions would have proceeded on them. Nevertheless, some broad points may be made. Learning from the Germans from both world wars, it is imperative to perfect the rapid movement of man and material along all fronts interchangeably for attack and reinforcement purposes. Since a two-front war against India would be of short duration because of the nuclear factor, the enemies would strike to make quick strategic gains, which India would speedily have to counter. Air lift capacities would have to be substantially augmented. Trains and surface transport have to be highly dynamic. These would be rather obvious points.
Less obvious perhaps would be focussing attention on broad based naval action. Opening second fronts on foes ought to come in the earliest calculation, and opening naval fronts to cause strategic damage and diversion would naturally prefigure larger naval forces than now. The specifics of where the naval and expeditionary fronts may be opened are being left out of the discussion. And, finally, if Japan failed Germany with a second Russian front, that cannot happen with any ally or group of allies India positions against the two front threat. Such allies would have to be persuaded, rewarded and subsidised to make common cause with India.
India’s security lies in spreading the risks arising from the threat of a two front war. Alliance-building is critical to this. Alliance building is another form of politics except that it goes under the signature of geopolitics. Alliances have to be brilliantly crafted where all the parties have shared stakes; weaker parties have to be funded. These are all formulaic and should present no problem in the execution. But alliance building is a component of grand strategy to the extent that it is country-specific and usually tailor made. An alliance network of one country may not suit another unless they happen to be part of the same alliance.
A two front war stares India in the face. It is at the very least part of the coercion plans of China and Pakistan. The past serves as a guide to how it can be fought and managed. India must spare no effort and monies to bolster the armed forces in that course. INAV