Dr. Munmun Majumdar
Observers would be one in saying that India has indeed begun to implement its act east policy. Earlier India had been overly cautious but recent developments under the Modi Government increasingly demonstrate a greater political will in playing a part in shaping the changing security architecture in Asia Pacific. The joint communique between India and Vietnam in September 2014 opposing threats to freedom of navigation and use of coercion in the South China Sea, the signing of the 2015 defence framework between India and US that includes a pledge to increase each other’s capability to secure among others freedom of navigation across sea lanes of communication, the fact that India had sent four-ship naval flotilla to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia, as part of a visit to the South China Sea etc all seem to suggest that India’s Act east policy is about balancing China in the region. It is however, much more than that. China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean, its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea has reinforced the relevance of India’s relations with the countries of Asia Pacific. The Asia- Pacific region has always drawn the attention of India’s foreign policy makers. However, the contexts and thrusts of India’s approach to the region have changed. The Indian government in 2015 upgraded the look east policy to act east policy that continues to be driven by economic and security interests. It is extended beyond Southeast Asia underlining the importance of the geopolitics of the region. It is therefore about renewed attempt at bolstering ties with the region, taking part in the emerging strategic discourse, etc.
The look east policy was linked with India’s domestic considerations as an innovative attempt to link India’s landlocked Northeastern states with the stronger Southeast Asian economies. The significance of Northeast India has grown over the years because of its land linkages with Southeast Asia beginning with Myanmar. The challenge lies in acting east in a manner that can reap the consequential benefit of transforming India’s landlocked northeast to a land linked space. The big question is how can that come about? One way would be to convert Northeast India’s history and culture into a soft power resource. The shared heritage between India and the ASEAN region ranging from Borobudor, in Indonesia to Angkor Wat, the world’s largest religious monument, in Cambodia, the spread of Indian mythology and folklore, the Thai epic Ramakien based on the Ramayana etc are well known and documented. The shared cultural and traditional heritage between India’s northeast and the ASEAN countries are yet to be explored. The common food, culture, weaving motifs, hunting practices etc in their own unique way can be used as a link to strengthen relations. Similarly, just as educational Institutions have in the past played an important role where scholars from across Asia came to study in renowned Indian universities such as Nalanda and Takshashila in the present context educational institutions housed in Northeast India can play a very important role. Not simply as nodal points but much more than that. Courses on Southeast Asian history, politics, languages etc can be introduced in these universities so that students are exposed to the world of Southeast Asia. For this teachers specialized in the said areas can be employed to disseminate knowledge about Southeast Asian region with which India is seeking deeper engagement. Similarly, there could be exchange of students, teachers between the universities of Northeast India and Universities of Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s announcement of a proposal to open an ASEAN Studies Centre at the North-Eastern Hill University during his opening statement at the ASEAN-India Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is an encouraging step forward in this direction.
Northeast India houses many important Buddhist sites and important monasteries. Once again the path of the Buddha can be traced from Arunachal Pradesh to Myanmar and beyond. India could then utilize the Buddhist heritage circuits, so that there is an increase in the Asian pilgrims annually. This in turn will encourage greater interaction leading to an increase in trade, commerce and tourism in the entire region. While leading the Buddha Purnima prayers in May 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had said that “the 21st Century will be Asia’s century and without Buddha, this cannot be Asia’s century.” Clearly Prime Minister Modi’s placing of Buddhism at the centre of India’s diplomatic initiatives is a creative idea. A high profile Chinese Ambassador, Hu Shih, echoes the image of India as a cradle of wisdom that has given it an unique identity when he had said “India conquered and dominated China culturally for 20 centuries without ever having to send a single soldier across her border.” China has already started deriving geopolitical benefits from its Buddhist links. It is not necessary for India to undertake counter measures simply to checkmate Chinese Buddhist influence in India’s neighborhood. More importantly, its high time for India to think of the ways in which it can win the hearts of the Buddhist population of Southeast Asia that will entail for enduring relations between the two regions. Again, in the tourism sector specifically eco tourism can be promoted. For this to translate to reality two policy goals are currently pertinent. Firstly, there is the need to improve infrastructure, particularly in transportation and the service sector, second, to involve the local people in the activities. The service sector will have to be upgraded keeping in mind the fact that this is a seismic zone and therefore any construction will have to be friendly to the environmental needs. Simple cottages with clean essential facilities for a comfort break internet access and connectivity are the basic requirements that need to be fulfilled which would attract visitors from not just Southeast Asia but from world over. Needless to say the least for this to happen air connectivity, roads will have to sufficiently improve. For example state capitals be connected by direct flight to the capitals of the ASEAN countries together with simplifying travel formalities.
So far India has been unable to meet the expectations of its ASEAN friends who more often than not complain about New Delhi not ‘doing enough’. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s maiden presence at the 9th East Asia Summit and the 12th India-ASEAN summit in Myanmar provides a glimpse into India’s willingness to be involved in regional security issues beyond its shores. India’s maritime policy cannot be divorced from its Look/act East policy, in which the North East India factor is an important driver. For instance, the Kaladan multimodal project is intended to provide an outlet to landlocked North East India into the Indian Ocean (Mizoram in North East India to Sittwe port in Myanmar). The port connectivity has to be seen in conjunction with road and rail connectivity (the Asian Highway and the Trans-Asian Railway network). So far China has been able to draw advantage from India’s inability to implement projects on time and the lack of coordination among its various agencies and departments. The high level visits to some of the ASEAN countries that the Modi government undertook in a short span of time were meant to signal the shift to the goal of making up the lost ground of implementation of that policy that broadly encompasses the key elements of development of economic relations, strengthening of soft power ties etc, India’s act east policy will have to feature Northeast India with a clear road map in place. It would be action at the level of implementation indeed that will determine the success or failure of this policy. To establish its seriousness of India’s commitment towards the people of Northeast India the Modi government must demonstrate that the act east policy is much more than rebranding the existing policy.
The author is Associate Prof, Dept. of Political Science, North-Eastern Hill University