By Munmun Majumdar
While Russia’s actions in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, Crimea in 2014 and now Ukraine are seen as violations of a member state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Russia has all along denied any wrongdoing and illegal military involvement in Ukraine. Presently calls it “special military operation” in Ukraine on “sovereignty” grounds (as it was in 2014). It is essential to examine the claims used by Moscow to justify intervention and the different explanations of the Russian invasion that undoubtedly has great consequences also marked the beginnings of a direct challenge to the post-cold war order. In 2021 Moscow deployed more than 100,000Russian troops, raising the speculation of a potential invasion of Ukraine at that time. The ongoing events in Ukraine confirms this speculation and about restructuring and redefining the rules of European security order, the simmering great power rivalry that in a way compels thinking about spheres of influence.
Vladimir Putin for the last two decades, has requested that Russia must be an equal partner in rearranging the post-Cold War European security architecture. Specifically, it means Russia seeks to keep the now more or less independent former Soviet Republics as Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine is of particular importance due to its strategic location. In 2001, Putin articulated this request in the German Bundestag, and he repeated himself even more emphatically and in harsher terms at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. All such requests received widespread support in Europe in-principle, but without any follow up. The West is well aware of the price for an accommodation with Moscow that essentially is to accept de facto Russian influence in EU’s Eastern neighborhood. So, in reality given European history and the great role Russia has in it, this should be a matter of concern. Hence the real debate is once again about spheres of influence. The logical consequence of a recognition of a Russian sphere of influence is not simply giving in to Russian demands at the barrel of the gun. What must be clearly recognized is that it is crucial to grasp the diverse range of European perspectives on continental security. More importantly peace in Europe cannot be maintained without Russia or by going against Russia.
Amid widespread global condemnation of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, India’s cautious position when it abstained from the UN Security Council vote deploring Russian aggression and instead calling for “immediate cessation of violence” and “diplomatic negotiations and dialogue” made it clear that its stand is based on its national interest. India was among the three countries to abstain, along with China and the United Arab Emirates On 26 February 2022, when the United Nations Security Council held a vote on a resolution demanding that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. While Russia expressed its appreciation of India’s “independent and balanced” position, it brought back memories of 2014, following Russia’s intervention in Crimea, when India had abstained from a UN General Assembly vote condemning the annexation of Crimea. National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon at that time said “there are legitimate Russian and other interests involved and we hope they are discussed and resolved.” This caused many raised eyebrows. President Pranab Mukherjee in a media briefing attempted to make a correction when he said “we do not like the interference of a third country in the internal matters of any country.” India remained acquiescent to Russia’s act then and the current guarded response and its call for “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” reflects a similar display. Will this have a bearing on India’s aspiration to be a leading power? Apart from the possibilities of rendering it inconsequential in Europe, India’s relationship-notably with France, Germany and UK may be impaired especially when these countries have begun to increasingly support India’s geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, India’s approach will raise doubts in Washington about India’s credibility as a strategic partner. US has called on India to distance itself from Russia. Surely fundamental questions relating to the extent to which India can afford to take this position and whether such a stand is compatible given that Russia is threatening to go to an extent of generating a nuclear crisis will certainly be raised.
It is correct to say that Russia is a major supplier of weapons for India. In 2021, they had signed a 10-year defence cooperation pact, that included the sale of S-400 surface-to-air missile systems worth US$5.43 billion and a deal to manufacture more than 600,000 Russian AK-203 assault rifles in India. Russia is also helping India with its ambitious nuclear energy expansion. The two countries signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2017. Russia is currently building a 6,000-MW plant at Kudankulam, which will have six nuclear reactors. India and Russia have also agreed to expand nuclear cooperation in third countries. In these engagements what must not be overlooked however, is that the dependence is mutual. Between 2016-2020 Russia accounted for 23% of Russian arms sales to India. Considering the steady decline in Russian weapons exports since 2017, Moscow cannot afford to refrain on weapons transfers to India. Russia is essential to India’s nuclear energy market. Equally India offers a potentially huge market to Moscow. Clearly therefore, the weapon connection was not the only reason for India’s stand in the UN. Instead, India’s response to the challenging foreign policy issue where it has taken a cautious stand displayed strategic autonomy. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, to express his deep anguish about the loss of lives and properties without criticizing Russia validates New Delhi’s desire not to alienate Ukraine. The Indian Space Research Organisation’s semi cryogenic engine for example is being developed on Ukrainian supplied RD-810 designs and many Indian navy warships depend on Ukrainian gas turbines.
New Delhi has sought to push back the impression that abstaining amounts to being soft on Russia emphasizing that it has always opposed to violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity and upheld its fundamental interest committed to a stable rule based global order. Such a position is in sync with New Delhi’s stand on China’s violation of Indian sovereignty on the India- China border, China’s actions in the South China sea etc. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, who was also India’s ambassador in Russia, in his opinion piece said: “We [India] have very friendly ties with the US, Europe and Russia and would prefer not to take sides. This would require very deft diplomacy on our part.” “This is not fence-sitting but a dispassionate evaluation of the complex roots of the crisis based on its own experience in the subcontinent.” Unlike the Chinese Foreign Minister wang Yi’s remark during his telephonic conversation with Foreign Minister Serei Lavrov when he referred to “Russia’s legitimate concerns on security issues” India has not made any such reference. (The writer is Prof. Dept of Political Science, North-eastern Hill University, Shillong)
India’s current stand is seemingly consistent with its past stand and one thing that clearly emerges is that a key concern for India in the days to come will be to keep an eye on how the Ukraine crisis will unfold and whether the crisis will bring Moscow and Beijing closer.
(The writer is Prof. Dept of Political Science, North-eastern Hill University, Shillong)