By K N Kumar
The Shillong Times allows me to write a series of articles on the nature, structure, and mechanics of Indian democracy. I plan to work within a framework that utilizes micro examples and extrapolates them to the broader context, enabling the reader to gain deeper and more comprehensive insights. I would like to begin by examining how the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system influences election outcomes in the state’s legislative constituencies, using specific examples.
Meghalaya’s democratic journey reveals a story that is both fascinating and troubling. The ‘First-Past-the-Post’ system deeply impacts a small state with fewer than 2.1 million voters. The seemingly simple process of FPTP produces outcomes that contradict the core principle of majority rule, which, in theory, is the cornerstone of a strong democracy. The voter turnout in Meghalaya typically hovers around 75%, significantly higher than in many other parts of India. Such high participation might suggest a strong connection between voter engagement and election results, but that is not entirely the case. Genuine voters eventually realize that they have been wronged due to the mathematics of FPTP. Winning candidates often secure just a third of the total votes, with margins sometimes being fewer than a few hundred votes, or even less in some cases.
It’s helpful to step back and understand why and how this happens. Meghalaya’s political landscape is highly fragmented. Regional parties, such as the UDP, the HSPDP, and more recently, the PDF and VPP, coexist with national parties like the INC, BJP, AITC, and the NPP. In many constituencies where seven or eight candidates often compete. When votes are split among many candidates, the winner doesn’t need a majority—just a plurality (meaning the candidate who gets more votes than any other). The FPTP system doesn’t care if sixty or seventy percent of voters support other candidates; it simply declares the candidate with the most votes as the winner.
The numbers reveal the distortion. Let’s compare two elections. In the 2018 assembly elections, the National People’s Party formed the government with 20.6% of the polled votes but won 32.2% of seats (19/59). It formed the government with post-election allies, while the INC, which had received a larger share (28.5%) and got 21 seats, sat in the opposition. In 2023, the NPP increased its vote share to 31.48% and secured 43.3% of the seats (26), nearly half the assembly. However, this still meant that 68.52% of voters had chosen someone other than the winning candidates.
On the ground, the situation is even more stark. Over the last five assembly elections, at least a dozen candidates have won with fewer than 1,000 votes in Meghalaya. In the 2023 elections, the candidate from Dadengre won by only an 18-vote margin. Similar small margins occurred in Songsak, Mairang, Mawhati, and other constituencies. At the national level, the situation is essentially the same. In India’s 2024 General Elections, only 6 out of 543 Members of Parliament (MPs) were elected with more than 50% of the votes cast in their constituencies, meaning 98.9% of MPs won with a plurality rather than a majority. Data from the Election Commission of India (ECI) further shows that 178 MPs (approximately one-third) won with 30% or less of the total votes cast, including 57 of the BJP’s 240 MPs (23.75%), 30 of Congress’s 99 MPs (30.3%), and 31 of the Samajwadi Party’s 37 MPs (83.78%). This highlights how FPTP can result in winners who do not reflect the majority of voter preferences, particularly in multi-candidate races.
One clear point not to be missed here: regardless of which party wins, the combined vote share of the losing candidates is always higher than that of the winner. Just keep in mind that in this system, there are no prizes for second place and no representation for scattered but essential voices. These are not isolated cases but repeat patterns, election after election. Over the past fifty years, Meghalaya’s governments have been formed not on clear majorities but on narrow pluralities facilitated by the quirks of FPTP.
Supporters of FPTP often claim that the system’s main strength is the stability it offers. They argue it avoids gridlock seen in proportional representation by producing clear majorities and decisive governments. However, in Meghalaya and the larger Northeastern region, the situation is different. Instead of creating stability, FPTP in these small hill states has frequently led to fragile coalitions, shifting alliances, and governments formed not by the people’s actual choice but through post-election negotiations. Let’s look at this closely now.
Between 1998 and 2008, Meghalaya experienced five different governments, with some lasting only a few months. The 2008–2013 assembly term alone saw three chief ministers as alliances shifted and legislators defected. Even after the 2018 elections, when the NPP staked a claim to form the Government, it had to attract smaller parties and independents to form a government. The resulting coalition had enough members, but there was constant speculation about reshuffles, defections, and even no-confidence motions. This record challenges the idea that FPTP provides stability.
Across the North East, FPTP has caused similar distortions. In Nagaland in 2003, the Naga People’s Front did not win a majority but formed a government by forging a post-election alliance with smaller parties. Such practices became so common in the country that new terms, such as ‘resort politics’ and ‘number shopping,’ have now entered the Indian political vocabulary. Manipur offers another example. In 2017, the Congress won twenty-eight seats, more than any other party, yet it was the BJP, with twenty-one seats, that formed the government by bringing in smaller parties and independents. In 2016, Arunachal Pradesh saw a major political upheaval when 43 of 44 Congress MLAs, led by Chief Minister Pema Khandu, defected to the People’s Party of Arunachal Pradesh (PPA). This shift followed months of instability, a Supreme Court ruling, and internal dissent within the Congress party. For the average voter, the party they chose to govern was no longer in power within months, replaced through manoeuvres entirely outside the ballot box. Over the past decade, such shifts have become so common that discussions of democracy in our country often take on a farcical tone.
The myth that FPTP guarantees stability is disproven by this historical record. FPTP has not stopped instability; it has just shifted the focus from pre-election campaigns to post-election negotiations. Rather than parties building broad platforms before voting, they depend on fragmented results and negotiate afterward. Instead of giving voters a clear voice in choosing who should govern, it gives disproportionate power to smaller groups of MLAs whose support becomes essential in hung legislatures. Far from creating stable governments, it has resulted in governments often forming coalitions of convenience.
What makes this situation even more paradoxical is the high voter turnout in these states. Literacy rates in Sikkim and Mizoram surpass ninety percent, and Meghalaya’s is well above seventy-five. These voters can understand and engage with systems more advanced than simple FPTP arithmetic. Small constituencies could, under a different system, enable more responsive and representative governance. In the northeastern states, elections are marked by great enthusiasm, yet the governments that form do not truly reflect voters’ preferences. It’s a spectacle of narrow wins and post-election deals, all clothed in the rhetoric of majority rule. The irony is apparent. In the NER, where democracy is the most natural, its practice remains painfully incomplete. The FPTP system, in my view, is a flawed colonial relic that, like all other inherited relics, is grossly inadequate and defective. Still, the desire for change is weak because those who benefit from these distortions are the ones who must carry out reforms. We know that relics are useless, but we still keep them. That is the irony!
(The writer is a former IAS officer)