By Bhogtoram Mawroh
In the last few weeks, there has been a demand put forward by different groups for the need for a Territorial Army for Meghalaya, considering the highly sensitive border that it shares with Bangladesh. The need for it was reiterated by Cabinet Minister and MDA spokesperson Paul Lyngdoh, who claimed that, apart from the Border Security Force (BSF), the state government needs the support of local villagers to deal with the challenges of influx and illegal migration. The KSU General Secretary, Donald V Thabah, recalled that the idea of a local paramilitary unit or “People’s Army” was raised during the Pyrdiwah incident when Bangladeshi paramilitary soldiers attacked and captured Pyrdiwah village, leading to the death of 21 people.
However, there is a lack of clarity about what exactly is meant by the ‘People’s Army’ and how it is similar to the ‘Territorial Army’. The Territorial Army has a very robustly designed recruitment process where only those who have a job or are gainfully employed (declaration in an affidavit and submission of their PAN card) can serve in it. So, it might very well be that many people who are staying in the border regions may not be able to join the Territorial Army. The service usually lasts only a couple of months each year, and when not on duty, the volunteers return to their regular jobs. So, it will not be like a permanent force stationed with weapons, ready for action all the time. What appears to be the confusion is between the concept of a Territorial Army, which is a branch of the Indian Army, and something like the Salwa Judum, which was a militia mobilised and deployed as part of counter-insurgency operations in Chhattisgarh. It appears the groups making the demand mean something like the latter and not the former. If so, then it is a demand fraught with great danger, the most obvious being the militarisation of society.
While illegal influx from across the border is being argued as a justification for the need for an armed militia, clashes along the India-Bangladesh border have not always involved the action of illegal Bangladeshis from across the border. After the Union Government passed the CAA, Ichamati in Shella, a border village, saw clashes between the indigenous Khasis and the non-indigenous population. It’s entirely possible that in such a situation, members of the armed militia may get involved in supporting one side over the other. Think about Manipur and how the proliferation of weapons led to acts of ethnic cleansing being committed by both sides.
We also have a sensitive border with Assam, which has seen multiple clashes. The clashes in Langpih and Mukroh are the most prominent examples. Because of the recent eviction drive in Assam, which targets Bengali Muslims accused of being illegal Bangladeshis, the government might very well permit armed militia units in villages along the Meghalaya-Assam border. Is it possible that the members of these units might also take part in retaliation when violence erupts?
Imagine there is an armed militia unit based in a border village with Assam that is now trained and armed. One day, Assam officials come, try to erect an illegal structure, the local people come out to protest, violence ensues, and the Assam police fire, killing people. Some members of the unit lose their friends and family members. Does the unit retaliate, or do they wait for officials from both sides to talk among themselves, put up an inquiry whose report never comes out? Even if the report comes out, there is no action taken against those who opened fire and killed the people. What has happened to the Langpih report? Did anyone take action against the officer who ordered the firing? What will members of the armed militia do, who lost friends and family, when they see justice failing them?
Recently, the Opposition Leader and former Chief Minister, Mukul Sangma, has warned that militancy is resurfacing in Meghalaya. According to him, “Already many youth have gone and joined armed groups and completed their training as well,” and inputs “indicate that many qualified youth with professional degrees, out of frustration and anger, have resorted to rebellion.” This has been confirmed by the DGP Idashisha Nongrang as well.
Starting from 2009 till 2018, Garo Hills was rocked by violence carried out by the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), with the group involved in killing, abduction, extortion, bomb blasts, and attacks on both security forces and civilians. In the late 1990s, the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) was also very active and involved in similar activities. While it is no longer the force it once was, the 2021 bomb blast in Laitumkhrah and the raising of HNLC flag during this year’s Independence Day is a reminder that the threat is not completely gone. Support for HNLC still exists among certain sections, and it is going to only spread if there is a feeling that the Khasis are under threat from external forces (illegal immigration, attack on their rights) with the government being in cahoots or unable to stop them. Combined with growing frustration, this is a very potent mix.
Groups like GNLA and HNLC will be very thrilled with the idea of an armed militia. They are going to have a ready-made armed group trained and ready to take up the fight against the state if they feel it has failed them. One can have thorough background checks and security protocols to ensure that the members of the armed militia do not overstep their bounds. But it must not be forgotten that these members are also part of the same society where ‘Jaidbynriew politics’ continues to be the main driving force during elections, when political leaders constantly drum into the population the existential threat from the “outsiders.” This gets amplified and confirmed when indigenous people, their faith, and practices are attacked (attacks on Christians around the country and the issue of the beef ban), or there is intrusion into their territory with the state failing to protect them, e.g., Assam-Meghalaya border. To this already volatile mix, if the lack of development and disenchantment with governance is added, it creates a very dangerous mix which can explode anytime.
Manipur is a very good example of how militarisation can destroy a society. I remember back in university, my friends and I would often poke fun at the states we came from. To the Meiteis, we would tease them by saying, “In Manipur, you either die at the hands of security forces, or the militants, or due to drug overdose.” My Meitei friends would themselves tell me stories of how violence had become normalised in their society. They would be outside playing chess when security forces would prod them from behind with the barrel of a gun. There was a senior police officer who had a habit of firing indiscriminately into the locality whenever the mood struck him. Then I went to Kangpokpi in Manipur’s Senapati district, which is the town that forms the buffer between the Meiteis and the Kuki-Chin-Mizo. I was told by my Kuki friend not to roam outside the village on my own because of the presence of security forces and militants. This was more than 10 years ago, a long time before the present Manipur conflict.
Will Meghalaya become another Manipur? And what role will arming ordinary citizens play in that? Maybe I am just trying to overstate the dangers, and the scenarios I have painted will never come to pass. I hope so, and I will be very happy to be proven wrong. But if there’s a small chance that it might happen, the example of Salwa Judum will be very pertinent. It was successful in countering the Naxal threat to some extent, but in 2011, Chief Minister Raman Singh described the movement as “over” because it was counter-productive and “innocent people were being killed.” In the end, it was indigenous people killing their fellow indigenous people.The solution to securing the border and protecting the indigenous communities of Meghalaya is not an armed militia but a regular force, e.g., a special battalion made up of retired soldiers or serving officers from the police, stationed at vulnerable locations at all times. If need be, there should be a recruitment drive, and the people who get selected should have the same pay and benefits as any regular armed service. This will not only create good local jobs but also ensure that society is not militarised. In the end, the solution should not become worse than the problem it set out to eradicate.
(The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect in any way his affiliation to any organisation or institution.)