By Srinivasan K. Rangachary
The public statement of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on June 24, 2011, after the conclusion of the 21st Plenary meeting of the group, stated that “The NSG agreed to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies;” without elaborating the changes to the guidelines. However, it is commonly understood that one of the major substantive changes, of concern to India, to the guidelines was the condition that suppliers should not authorise the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and equipment and technology, if the recipient is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is in full compliance with its obligations under the treaty. The changes to the NSG guidelines have caused some concern in India since India is not a member of the NPT and hence under the new NSG guidelines not eligible for ENR (enrichment and reprocessing) transfers from the NSG members. In what manner and how seriously do these changes affect the Indian nuclear programme?
The enrichment and reprocessing facilities in India are all built on indigenous technology. The facilities are usually kept out of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards except, when they contain safeguarded material as in the case of some of the reprocessing facilities. If the current Indian technologies in both these areas are in line with the best contemporary practice, then there is no need for India to import facilities or technology and the changes to the guidelines should have very little practical impact on the Indian civil nuclear programme. What if the Indian level of expertise in one or more of these areas in not up to the best international standard? The Indian indigenous civilian nuclear power programme has been planned in three stages with the first stage being based on the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) run on natural uranium, the second stage being the Fast Breeder programme running on plutonium obtained from reprocessing of the spent fuels from both PHWRs and Light Water Reactors (LWR) and the third stage being advanced reactors based on thorium fuel. The only need for enrichment of uranium arises from the need to obtain highly enriched uranium (HEU) for India’s nuclear submarine programme. The imported LWRs will be covered by the accompanying fuel supply agreements making it unnecessary for India to enrich uranium for its LWR programme. And since India’s natural uranium reserves are low, there is little or no possibility of India entering commercial enrichment facilities.
The matter is slightly more complex in the case of reprocessing technology. India already operates three reprocessing facilities. The total capacities of these plants have so far been sufficient to satisfy the current needs of reprocessed fuel. However, as the civil nuclear power sector expands with the import of LWRs, expansion of the PHWR programme and the introduction of FBRs (Fast Breeder Reactor), there will be a need to increase substantially the reprocessing capabilities in India.
The Russian government, for example, passed a resolution No. 992 on December 9, 2009 which, allowed export of isotope uranium enrichment plant, chemical processing of irradiated nuclear India, ENR and NSG fuel as well as relating to such installation of equipment and technologies to any state not a nuclear weapon state only if that state is a party to the NPT.
What about reprocessing technology and facilities? India may require importing reprocessing facilities or technology. Although a large number of countries have, or had operated in the past, reprocessing facilities and currently only eight countries namely, China, France, India, DPRK, Pakistan, Japan, UK and Russia have operating facilities. Of these eight countries four – France, Japan, UK and Russia – are members of G8 and are, therefore, already enforcing NPT membership as criteria for transfer of reprocessing facilities and technology. None of remaining four either operate any large scale commercial reprocessing plant, of the size that would be needed by India in future or have any technology superior to that already possessed by India. Hence, the recent NSG changes to its guidelines will have no practical impact on India’s access to globally competitive reprocessing technology.
Therefore, a transfer of ENR technology to India under the current environment can be made only if India agrees to such conditions i.e. allow for an examination by IAEA or mutually agreed experts to decide whether or not any similar ENR facility constructed by India subsequent to an ENR transfer is or is not based on the transferred technology i.e. whether or not the constructed facility should or should not be covered by IAEA safeguards.
Hence for all practical purposes the recent NSG changes should not have any appreciable impact on India’s civil nuclear programme and should not be a matter of concern from that angle. Under the circumstances it may not be out of place to suggest or assume that the NSG changes were directed primarily against India. So what should India do now? Currently, NSG is considering on how to accommodate India as an NSG member. As NPT membership is also a criterion for admittance of new members to NSG, the NSG will, therefore, have to craft a language that will allow India to circumvent this requirement. If the NSG is willing to grandfather this language in respect of ENR transfers as well then India may not have any problem with the revised NSG guidelines. If, however, the NSG is unwilling to consider such a move then India may reconsider its approach to the issue of NSG membership and decline NSG’s offer of NSG membership. Why? Under the current environment, neither India nor the NSG stand to gain or lose much if India is not a member of the NSG. To recapitulate the reasons for such a conclusion:
India has already got an NSG exemption allowing for NSG members to trade in civil nuclear commerce with India without fulfilling the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards; India has formally declared its adherence to the NSG guidelines; India has a robust export control system in place;
That being the case, a country refused a nuclear transfer license by an NSG member can approach any non-NSG member for technical and industrial assistance and India will be one of the few countries with the full range of nuclear activities that would be able assist such countries. Since India will not be member of the NSG, even if it agrees to adhere to NSG guidelines, there will be no bar on transfers from India to NPT members in good standing. It will make commercial sense as well for India to delink its nuclear commerce from that of the major NSG members who have been in the forefront of actions against India in the NSG. INAV