By Dr. Munmun Majumdar
The visit of the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, saw Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosting a Gujrati dinner on the banks of the river Sabarmati in Ahmedabad, while the Chinese and Indian troops were engaged in a tense face-off at Chumar and Demchok in Ladakh. The intruders had to be confronted with show of force by an Indian infantry battalion. This year alone saw 335 transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by the PLA. There have also been unprecedented cyber-attacks on Indian networks. Again, China either denied Visas to the residents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir or issues stapled Visas to them on the pretext that these are disputed territories. The border dispute highlights the growing strategic competition and lack of trust between them. PM Modi while seeking an early settlement of the territorial dispute expressed serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. He pointed out that demarcation of the LAC would enhance efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity. In turn, President Xi Jinping said that China was determined to work with India through friendly consultations to settle the boundary question at an early date, and to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas till the dispute is resolved.
It is over 35 years since the former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in 1979, attempting to bridge the gap between the two countries. At that time, Foreign Minster Vajpayee had reportedly countered the late Deng Xiaoping’s intentions of setting the border issue aside for future generations to resolve while proceeding ahead with normalization of relations, by his spontaneous wit, citing the Indian maxim ‘kalkare so aajkar, aajkare so ab’ in reply. Yet, it was Deng Xiaoping’s line that was allowed to prevail ultimately. Prolonged negotiations have been conducted at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute. The Special Representatives of the two Prime Ministers have met more than a dozen times. Nonetheless, there has been little progress on this sensitive issue. China continues to be in physical occupation of large areas of Indian Territory in Ladakh since the mid-1950s. China continues to stake its claim to parts of the Indian Territory in Arunachal Pradesh which it calls Southern Tibet. China’s official position is that it is a sacred duty of the PLA to get the area under its control.
The LAC between India and China, implying de facto control after the 1962 war, is yet to be physically demarcated on the ground and delineated on military maps. This is a major destabilising factor as it leads to frequent transgressions.The relationship in the near future will depend upon how the two leaders address the key security and strategic issues. Bilateral economic dealings may be one aspect of the talks more so since mutual economic dependence is on the rise. Bilateral trade is now worth US$ 65 billion and is expected to cross US$ 80 billion by 2017 – even though the balance of trade is heavily tilted in China’s favor. President Xi’s big-ticket investment plans possibly $100 billion to help rapidly upgrade Indian industry, infrastructure and railways. This is what Modi wants for he knows that cooperation with China in areas of clear mutual interest is necessary. He is aware that if Japan offers better industrial technology, China offers huge market for Indian IT and pharmaceutical exports that should cut India’s enormous trade deficit -a record of around $31 billion last year. As for China it is keen to invest more in India, seeing the country as a huge untapped market. This aligns with Chinese ambitions to establish a South Asian economic corridor through India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China. Additionally the pragmatic business wisdom that China has, it has not lost sight of the fact that Modi as Chief Minister of Gujrat, had visited China several times, took pains to print his business card in Mandarin and took steps to gain Chinese investments. Of course, economics while vital, does not solely define the complex Sino-Indian relationship. There are other important strategic factors are in play. The current Chinese leadership sees India as a significant geopolitical and diplomatic actor, both regionally and globally, and President Xi has announced that India will be a ‘priority’ for Chinese diplomacy. However, the factors promoting convergence do not mean that extant mutual distrust and bilateral challenges such as the border dispute will become less relevant. On the contrary, these differences will continue to cast a shadow over China-India relations.
The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement and the 2005 “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” accompanying the “Agreement on Political Parameters & Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question” have indicated how atmospherics projected by the official documents have so far run way ahead of substantive content. The immediate task before the leadership in India and China is to examine the relevance of the stated principles underlying their relationship. Pancheel has never been a trusted in India-China relations at least not from the Indian perspective after the 1962 war. Its key weakness being that there is no way of ensuring observance of its provisions in practice or seeking remedy against transgressions. Marking the 55th anniversary of the India-China diplomatic ties, the joint statement noted that both countries must show “readiness to resolve outstanding differences in a proactive manner” and must continue with the development of bilateral relations. But these expectations were soon belied when the Chinese Ambassador was heard publicly asserting claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s visit – a far cry from hopes of a final settlement on the “boundary question” that completely reversed the clock.
All of these strikes a cord of cautious warning in view of the directive from Xi Jinping asking the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for combat for winning regional war came only days after his visit to India. India’s foreign policy overhauling is glaring and Modi, so far, has made the right strategic and tactical moves that seem to be paying off. Starting with Bhutan, he not only went on to resurrect India’s bonds with Asia but also gained ground in seeking to raise India’s geopolitical profile.
Clearly, both Xi and Modi are making special efforts to reach out to each other. The key question is whether Modi can apply his strategic acumen in prodding the potential adversary to become a potential partner. Any success or failure to draw the maximum from the strategic and economic opportunities hinges on their ability find a simple explanation if not a quick solution for the old boundary dispute. The way forward would be to undoubtedly focus on tapping all possible complementarities and on mutually beneficial economic and cultural ties. India and China have been cooperating in international fora like the WTO and climate change negotiations. Limited cooperation has also taken place in energy security. Overall, the outlook is one of cautious optimism for the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister and President Xi’s special envoy to India has likened the Sino-Indian partnership to a ‘massive buried treasure.’ Perhaps some of that treasure is about to be uncovered.
( The author is Associate Prof, Dept of Political Science,
North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong)