By Rahul Saikia
Whilst discussing contemporary political developments in Assam, a progressive friend of mine recently remarked, “I have always believed that Assam will show the way for the rest of India”. Given his progressive leftist ideas, I naturally assumed that my old friend was referring to the diverse communities of Assam and their respective histories of resistance against various colonial and nationalist hegemonies. In all probability, he now hoped that this complex melting pot of ethnic identities and political movements would work as a bulwark against the contemporary pan-Indian ascendance of the BJP and its right-wing Hindutva agenda.
With exit polls suggesting a BJP led government in Assam, it would be tempting (and partly correct) to suggest that this hopeful hypothesis of ‘ethnic resistances to counter mainland nationalism’ has suffered a serious setback. That said, the BJPs predicted success in the state makes it all the more pertinent to carefully reconsider the limits and possibilities of such a hypothesis. Given its recent Hindutva flexing on the national stage, it is entirely possible that a BJP government in Assam has the potential to intensify the already fragile and fractured fabric of communal co-existence – both in the state and the larger north-eastern region. For the people of the north-east – with our collective (albeit uneven) experiences of state oppression and militant violence – the entry of Hindutva is probably the last thing we need at this particular moment.
From a progressive perspective, the primary fear here is that government in Dispur will provide Modi and Shah with a firm frontier base from which they could slowly knit and propagate their divisive right-wing agenda over the entire region. At the same time, a BJP victory will also confirm another dangerous trend – the emergence of a new Assamese middle class that is re-fashioning itself in the image of the emerging mainland Indian model of monetary arrogance and secular ignorance.
To be sure, the potential emergence of right-wing majoritarian fascism is perhaps the single biggest threat to the ideas of Indian democracy – especially in states like Assam which have a complex demographic situation. That said, it is also rather evident that the BJPs recent electoral popularity is not so much a reflection of popular Hindu support for Hindutva, as much as it is an en-masse rejection of successive Congress governments and their politics of corruption, nepotism and pseudo-secularism. There is definitely some merit to both these arguments. In the case of Assam both these arguments come together in the contentious illegal immigrant issue.
Apart from its promises of good governance, it is the general perception that the BJP will be able to resolve the problem of ‘illegal influx’ from Bangladesh which has assured the party a powerful support base within the state. This perception of the BJP as a saviour of Assamese Hindus is highly problematic because it effectively provides the nationalist party a licence to pursue its Hindutva agenda with the full support of the local majority. Still, it should be noted that this fertile ground for Hindutva aspirations has only been made possible through the Congress government and a section of the state’s population.
With its relatively secular credentials, the state Congress government was well positioned to develop a long term and realistic strategy of negotiating with the issue of illegal immigration. Aside from failing to secure such a viable solution, there is a growing perception that the Congress instead adopted a de-facto strategy of creating and appeasing minority vote-banks to ensure its own political supremacy in the state. While this ‘secular pragmatism is indeed a major cause for the current backlash, it will be pointed out that Assamese angst and mobilization against illegal immigration predates the Tarun Gogoi government.
After all, Assamese Hindus (or ‘caste Assamese’ as scholars prefer) have long been wary of the threat of being demographically overwhelmed by large scale illegal immigration from Bangladesh. Even as some of these concerns are genuine, the popular reaction has often been to project a sense of cultural self-purity in the face of this ‘dangerous other’. At best, this kind of communal pride can act as an opiate balm in an uncertain and changing world. At worst, it can lead to bloody riots (Godhra in 2002) and horrible massacres (Nellie in 1983).
To be sure, the problem of illegal immigration throws up significant cultural and economic challenges for Assamese’s various communities – including the Assamese, the Bengalis and the Plain Tribals. These concerns become all the more pertinent given the recent ascendance of radical fundamentalism within Bangladesh – the adverse effects of which – could soon reverberate onto states like Assam. In such a scenario, it would be both wrong and rather condescending to simply equate these Assamese concerns with a broad scholarly label of ‘fanatic nationalism’.
Still, it could be argued that the Assamese sense of cultural insecurity and communal pride against a common enemy (i.e. ‘illegal Muslim immigrants’) has several striking commonalities with certain aspects of the RSS’s Hindutva ideology. These common interests would explain why the BJP has found such a fertile valley of right wing nationalist support within the state. Moreover, it is not just the Assamese but several other communities within the state (e.g. the Bodos) which share this perceived communal enemy along with the BJP and its parivar.
To some extent, these national-and-regional alliances will temporarily weaken the real and imagined threats associated with the influx issue. At the same time however, these de-facto Hindutva backed agreements will severely limit the extent to which these regional stakeholders can effectively counter the BJP’s right wing agenda within Assam. For its part, the BJP could further use this strong anti-immigrant feeling as a powerful tool to continually divide and rule the state along communal lines.
One can only hope that the BJP and its nationalist supporters in Assam will realize that such a divisive strategy could be disastrous for the people of the state and the entire north-eastern region. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was hegemonic incursions of Indian and Assamese nationalisms which sparked numerous ‘hill tribal’ mobilizations culminating in the creation of states like Meghalaya and Mizoram. This time around however, it is Assam itself (as well as the rest of the region) which runs the risk of being torn apart – in a manner which no peace loving people could either support or endure.
( The writer is M.Phil Research Scholar at the Delhi School of Economics… and a long time Shillong resident)
Given this possibly bleak scenario, it is perhaps important for all the concerned stakeholders to make certain conciliatory acknowledgements. Firstly, could we acknowledge that the BJP and many of its supporters in Assam have both – their own legitimate concerns and development aspirations – as well as certain communal misgivings and shortcomings? Secondly, could we also acknowledge that Assamese Muslims and Bengali Hindus are equally legitimate and important stakeholders who could possibly alter longstanding fears over illegal immigration and radicalization? Thirdly, would it not be important to explore the potentially diverse impacts of labour immigration from Bangladesh – from positive (e.g. for the state’s booming construction sector) to possibly negative (in the case of indigenous peasant groups)? One could compile a much longer list of such important queries – but they would all be underpinned by the same basic question to be directed all the concerned stakeholders. The question is – do we negotiate with one another to find some sort of sustainable peace – or do we keep fighting for our own self-interests? Even if Assam cannot show the best way forward for the rest of India – perhaps it can still find a peaceful way for itself and the people of the region.