In a clear break from usual protocol practices, Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose to personally receive his Bangladesh counterpart Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina at the airport on her official visit to India from 7-10 April 2017. The gesture set the tone for what followed. Bilateral ties between the two neighbors have seen a steady improvement in the past few years. Between 2010 and 2017 there have been four exchanges of visits at the level of heads of government with lengthy joint statements cataloguing what has been achieved and a clear declaration of intent on the way forward have been carefully drawn.
The two major issues that drew most attention were the defence related deal and whether there would be any forward movement on the thorny question of sharing of the waters with special focus on Teesta.
Prior to the Prime minister’s visit the defence agreement had been a prominent subject in the public discourse in Bangladesh. Analysts have been questioning the strategic consequences of a defence agreement with India and its implication for Bangladesh Sovereignty. Even sections within the ruling Awami League (AL) argue that a defence agreement with India will be politically suicidal for the party in the 2019 elections if a deal on Teesta is not arrived at. This is in stark contrast with the absence of a similar debate when Begum Khaleda Zia had signed a defence cooperation agreement with China in December 2002. A scan of the Bangladesh press of December 2002 endorses the fact that neither any journalists nor security experts debated or questioned the defence agreement with China. Does that mean that Bangladesh’s relations with India and China fall in two completely different categories? The text of the 2002 Agreement is not public and there is hardly any research in Bangladesh on the implications of that Agreement. The only noticeable element in the reports on the 2002 defence agreement with China is the then Foreign Minister Morshed Khan’s statement that the agreement is not directed against any other country and would not affect Bangladesh’s relations with India. While it is true that China’s growing strategic proximity with Bangladesh raise an alarm in New Delhi what is certain is that the defence cooperation agreement is not a reaction to Xi Jingping visit and China’s proposed intention to invest USD 24 billion in Bangladesh.
The defence deal saw the light of the day with the signing of two major documents, one a framework Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the other a USD 500 million line of credit for the Bangladesh military. The deal provided a framework for institutionalizing the defence cooperation between the two militaries that has been on the rise in recent times.
While the defence agreement was signed, arriving at an agreement on sharing of water with a focus on the Teesta issue was again delayed as work in progress. Earlier during his official visit to Dhaka in 2015, Prime Minister Modi had said, “rivers should nurture the India-Bangladesh relationship and not become the source of discord”. Keeping the same tempo alive a noteworthy difference on the Teesta issue this time however, was a public pronouncement by Prime Minister Modi that a solution to this matter would be found during the tenures of the respective governments in Dhaka and Delhi. However, analysts believe that this commitment was, however, somewhat watered down in the Joint Statement issued following the official talks.
A significant event during this visit of the Bangladesh Prime Minister was the belated formal recognition from Bangladesh of the supreme sacrifices made by members of the Indian Armed Forces during its Liberation War in 1971, at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, in the presence of her Indian counterpart, honored seven of the Indian heroes who had laid down their lives for Bangladesh’s independence. The fact that Teesta found mention as one of Bangladesh’s lifelines by Master of Ceremony retired Colonel Sajjad Zahir, a decorated Bangladeshi freedom fighter, is again worth mention since it indicated that the unresolved Teesta River water sharing issue will remain as a major bone of contention until it finds a solution. The event also marked how the narrative about India was constructed and nurtured by regimes that dominated Bangladesh politics after 1975 that saw a change after the February 2008 visit of Moeen Uddin Ahmed, the Chief of the Bangladesh Army and the power behind the caretaker government. The military backed caretaker government under General Moeen Uddin Ahmed had invited Indian soldiers who had fought the liberation war to be part of the Victory Day celebration. He also had proposed, “to usher in a new era of close cooperation between the two armies”, thus heralding a new beginning and bringing about a difference in the narratives of the relationship between the two armed forces which until then, India was generally perceived as an unfriendly neighbor. Prime Minister Hasina took this process of recognizing India’s contribution, forward after she returned to power. Between 2008 and now, there have been several visits to Bangladesh by top Indian military officers that included the three chiefs. At the political level, visits by the President, Vice President and Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi have underlined the importance India ascribes to its relations with Bangladesh. Officers of the two countries have begun to attend courses at each other’s National Defence College. The two armies have regularly held the “Sampriti” anti-terror joint exercises since 2009 and have been sharing intelligence. Co-operation between the two marked new heights especially after the Burdwan blasts in 2014.
The outcome of the present visit by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina saw more than 20 deals covering a wide range of subjects that were signed following the official talks. India also offered to sell an additional 6o megawatt of electricity to Bangladesh. Similarly connectivity proposals were boosted with new rail and road connections. Border agreements between India and Bangladesh have begun to create a positive environment for the development of rail and road connectivity, inland waterways, coastal shipping and energy cooperation along the Bay of Bengal. A lack of connectivity through Bangladesh has made connectivity rather difficult and convoluted. For example, the distance between Agartala and Kolkata through the Silliguri corridor is three times than through Bangladesh. Therefore, Physical connectivity between India’s Northeast and Bangladesh presents game-changing possibilities.
Additionally a credit line of USD 4.5 billion from India was signed to cover costs related to multifarious projects, cooperation on peaceful nuclear technology and in outer space. Together with boosting Indian investments in Bangladesh, the ongoing cooperation on combatting trans-boundary terrorism and violent extremism was also agreed upon.
Although there are a number of unresolved bilateral issues yet considering that India Bangladesh relationship is rooted in history and conditioned by geography the compulsions for the two countries to pursue economic as well as security cooperation is evident. The reality of the Indian High Commission issuing the largest number of visas to Bangladeshi nationals cannot continue to be unseen for long. Against the developments leading to the defence cooperation agreement it can be concluded that seen from a broader perspective of the future trajectory of the unexplored potential in boosting relations between India and Bangladesh, the defence cooperation agreement is timely and indeed an appropriate step to consolidate, as well as institutionalize existing bilateral cooperation.
The writer is Associate Prof, Dept. of Political Science, North-Eastern Hill University.