By Monish Tourangbam and Arushi Singh
Just when the verdict was out that the reality of 21st century geopolitics pulls India and Russia apart, brings India and the United States together, and pushes Russia and China into a strategic embrace, the war in Ukraine affirmed one thing-it is not that simple. While India’s Indo-Pacific partnership with the West to manage China’s aggressive turn remains in place, Delhi’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has clearly raised eyebrows among its partners in the West, more particularly in the United States. India’s abstentions at the United Nations have made one thing clear, that Delhi is ready to take its ties with Washington and its allies to the next level but is not ready to break bridges with Moscow either. Despite facing substantial pressure to concur with its Western partners, Delhi has stood by its stance calling for peace and cessation of hostilities but refraining from blatantly criticising Russia.
Although the Russian offensive action in Ukraine has been followed by “strong economic sanctions and other measures” by the West, Delhi and Moscow continue to find ways of transacting business, yet again showing the complicated understanding of India’s own sense of partnerships in international relations. India, as part of its balancing act, despite sanctions, has been resolved to buy Russian oil while Indian banks find alternatives including a rupee-ruble workaround. Since the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the reset in the geopolitics of Europe, India’s foreign policy has come under global scrutiny, with several of its western counterparts calling India’s response “disappointing” or “shaky”. However, Delhi seems intent on not putting its feet on fire, for a conflict that has distinct geographical and historical trends, far removed from India’s own calculation of national interest.
India has repeatedly abstained from resolutions at the UN aiming to punish Moscow for its actions in Ukraine. It is worthwhile noting that just before the Ukraine saga played out, India and Russia did not seem to be on the same page on other geopolitical considerations. For instance, at the United Nations, a growing divergence was witnessed in the approaches undertaken by India and Russia in response to the Taliban take-over of Kabul. India along with the US, the UK and France wanted to iron out stiff demands to be presented to the Taliban. In sharp contrast, Russia in conjunction with China sought to weaken the language of the resolution on Afghanistan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in the first week of December last year was well timed to navigate India-Russia relationship in a transitory global order, disrupted by the strategic ramifications of a rising China and a USA whose ability and intention to shape the global order was being questioned. The sword of Damocles also hanged over India-Russia defence relations with the US retaining the capability to sanction India over its future acquisition, with India acquiring only a one-time waiver from the Countering American Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for the purchase of Russian made S-400 missile defence system.
Although India’s response to the Ukraine crisis, and the continued reliance on Russian military hardware supplies do indicate a substantial bedrock of the relationship, there are strategic compulsions of the Indo-Pacific region that will raise deeper questions for the direction of India-Russia partnership. Russia’s primary ambition to thwart and defy U.S. hegemony in the Euro-Atlantic theatre aligns with China’s intent to do the same in the Indo-Pacific. How does this play out for India’s own primary threat perception vis-à-vis China, and strategic alignment with the West, and particularly the United States? Opinions also abound that Moscow is expanding its “force multiplier role for China” while Beijing is wising up to the multi-vector US strategy of involving other countries to counter and contain China. Additionally, Kremlin’s threat perceptions are mainly based around politics and economics that abet cooperation with China. Russia perceives a fast boost in China’s power relative to the US, a rise whose impact was augmented by the diversion of American abilities and then a weakened resolve to retain its strategic dominance. To further make matters run more smoothly for their respective futures, both Moscow and Beijing are actively trying to avoid falling in the trap of a security dilemma. In emerging areas of cooperation, China and Russia are going strong, compensating for each other shortcomings, displaying a deep understanding of their respective vulnerabilities, and embarking on creative ways to plug those vulnerabilities. Outer Space is one of the best examples of such cooperation where Russia is able to offer expertise and experience while Beijing is able to piggyback off it, offering financial backing in return. A new lunar base, the International Lunar Research Station is in the works along with various other ventures aimed at getting first mover advantages in the domain.
Concomitantly, Russia appears to be wary of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy and is more focused on maintaining the Eurasian equilibrium that necessitates an understanding between Russia, China and India. However, the inaction on part of Russia when India was side-lined in Afghanistan where New Delhi spent considerable political and economic clout highlight preponderance that would be provided to Pakistan, another of India’s antagonistic neighbour. Furthermore, experts have posited that Moscow has chosen Pakistan and the Taliban to be safer partners in its quest to secure its southern flank vis-à-vis Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia is building more robust political engagement alongside expanding monetary and energy relationship with Pakistan. These developments provide Islamabad with an opportunity to build up presence in Eurasia where it may ramp up its activities to the woe of New Delhi indirectly and worse inadvertently, through considerable support of Moscow.
New Delhi has steadily embarked upon the principle of “convergence with many, but congruence with none.” However, India’s foreign policy in the near future is likely to face limitations of traction as the US constructs “closed bloc-type structures” to contain China. This development might preclude Russia from the decision-making process as well and any progress that might be feasible would be possible at the expense of India’s future cooperation with Russia. All partnerships come with a cost, and India’s partnership with Russia will certainly create new barriers for its relationship with the West and particularly with the United States. But at the end, it is for Delhi to do the math, for maximizing the gains and minimizing the losses in its external engagements.
*Monish Tourangbam teaches at the Amity Institute of International Studies (AIIS), Amity University (Noida) and is also the Honorary Director of the Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS).
Arushi Singh is a Research Scholar at the School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi.