By H H Mohrmen
This is another write-up about the famous Jañtia rebellion in a run-up to the 160 death Anniversary of U Kiang Nangbah.
When the efforts to get the Jañtia rebels to surrender failed, the only option remaining for the British was to prepare for a battle. Captain F.K Gilbert, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army Presidency Division, in his letter to Colonel Dunsford CB Commanding Jaintia District letter No. 452 dated, dated December 1, 1862 forwarded notes on the operation plan to be pursued by the officer and the troops on the ground in the fight against the Rebels.
The first and the most important point emphasized was to secure the base of operation. The suggestion was that two companies of Kamroop Regiment were to be posted at Sylhet and another under a European officer and the same strength at Cachar also under European officer. Notes were also sent to all the Deputy Commissioner requesting them to keep a sharp eye on the movement of the rebels who may come to the village or the markets in the plains for supply or to plunder. They are requested to provide immediate information to officers in the military command whose duty is to proceed immediately with a force to surprise and arrest the rebels.
It was also instructed that the remainder of the Kamroop Regiment was to be detached to the hills and employed as the commanding officer directed. It was also instructed that the head quarters of the Kamroop Regiment should be at Sylhet.
The order was that a Regiment of not less than 180 Rank and file were to be presented at the Headquarter in Cherrapunjee with a captain and two Subbalterns available to take command of patrols in force and moveable column. The remainder of the Regiment should be stationed at Nongkhlaw, Mawphlang, Iewduh, Shillong, Puriang, Nongkrem and Sohmynting. The strength of each company should be determined by the Officer in Command. At Iewduh and Sohmynting detachments of thirty rank and files were felt necessary. It would be of advantage to relieve them on a weekly basis. The relieving party will have to travel along the routes that are reported and suspected to be haunted by the rebels.
The party at Sohmynting should keep up communication with the headquarters of the detachment in the direction of Nongtalang. Whenever parties of rebels are heard of in this quarter, every detachment should be put in motion and every exertion made to intercept and seize them.
The base was thus being defended so that there will remain only the Jaintia hills free for rebels to move in, and the force to be used against them are the 28th Native Infantry, the 21st Native Infantry and the 44th Native Infantry. Two companies Kamrup regiment and 1st Police Battalion would also be employed in the battle.
It also stated that it is impossible for an officer who is located at a distance and without reliable intelligence to direct with advantage the details of movements of the parties. The Brigadier-General therefore suggested that whatever measures needed to be done with regards to the operations, are to be considered as general suggestions for consideration of the officer in immediate command of the troops.
The letter also sought to know the correct information about the location of the place where the families of the rebels and their stores were concealed. It said that the lack of detailed information about the area made it impossible for the Brigadier to propose a proper plan of attack against the rebels.
The Brigadier recommended Jowai to be the ordinary headquarter of the troops while they were engaged in an active operation against the rebels. This would enable the force to make a periodical relieve of the outpost and will also enable the commanding officers in the District to move out any moment with sufficient force any part of the district.
It was also necessary to send escorts to the different outpost in charge of supplies and rations which could not be done without a large force being assembled at Jowai. 250 men a cooley corps should be located at Jowai and placed entirely at the disposal of the officer commanding.
Detachments were to be sent from these Regiments to Amwai, Nongbah, Mynso, Ialong, Ladtuber, Shangpung, Nartiang and Jaintiapur. The second locality that would benefit from the posting of a regiment would be to the East and South of the District, the Headquarter to be at Kya Khullah (British spelling)/khatkasla, with detachment at Raliang and Khonchnong, parties in force to weekly patrol to Nongkhlieh. The headquarters of the Left Wing should be at Rngad, with detachment at Bataw, Dieñshalalu and other places which the commanding officer considered necessary.
The Third Regiment should be divided into Wings: The Headquarter and Right Wing to be at Shilliang Myntang and to send detachments to Nongjngi, Takhniang, Barato, Lapangap and Hurwan/Kyrwan.
The Left Wing is to have its headquarters at Nongtalang with detachment at Amkoi, Padu, and other places where circumstances at the moment may render necessary. The two remaining companies of Kamroop Regiment may be posted wherever the Officer Commanding may think desirable. In making this distribution of the troops, the Brigadier-General considered it important that the different detachments should be relieved at least bi-monthly, if they have to be stationery for a long period of time.
The rebels were now operating from the forest therefore it was advisable that the movement is general and simultaneous. It is also necessary that the activities of the troops are in such a way to ensure that the rebels have no rest or quiet. The movement of the troops should therefore be simultaneous it was suggested.
It was also suggested that if the stockade was really erected at Ooksai (Iooksi) and Nongphyllut, they must at first be attacked. Precaution was taken to surround every post to be assaulted to prevent the rebels from escaping. The lieutenant Governor has also settled the question as to the manners the Khasi, who wish to assist in the suppression of the rebellion, should be employed. They are to be enlisted in the police and the Brigadier-General recommends that parties of police be sent with all the military detachment for the purpose of obtaining intelligence regarding the haunts and strength of the rebels.
If after the capture of the stockade, the rebels run and conceal themselves there would be a general simultaneous movement of all corps and detachment throughout the district. The Brigadier General would not allow any terms to be offered to them, and all who were caught with arms and in opposition should be at once executed. If men come in, and surrender unconditionally, they will be pardoned, unless the crime of murder in cold blood is proved against them, and except for such acts or marked instances of recusancy, men should be executed for political crimes by sentence of a judicial enquiry.
It also emphasized that every endeavour should be made to seize the stores and cattle of the rebels and to capture women and children. Later they decided that it would be advisable to remove them to Cherrapunjee. They should be well treated but kept under restraint until the rebellion ends.
It was left to the local officer to decide with regards to the disposal of the stores and cattle confiscated. The Brigadier General (BG) also said that he did not consider it advisable except in cases of necessity to destroy the grain or appropriate the cattle. The loss of both in the country may lead to famine and distress. The BG was of the opinion that the discomfort and distress caused by constant movements of the troops through the country and the capture of their families would induce the rebels to come in and offer their submission.
A. Eden officiating Secretary to the Government of Bengal to BG Sergeant G.D. Showers, C.B. commanding Presidency Division (No. 5159, dated the 9th December 1862) informed that Lt G approved all the instructions to BG St G.D Showers C.B. except with regard to the item related to the execution of the captured rebels. The LG requested Shower to instruct the officer commanding that no one though caught with arms and in opposition to the government can be executed until he has been brought before a commissioner appointed under Act XI. Of 1857, tried, and found guilty of capital offence.