By Rattan Chand Sharma
The Indo-Bangladesh border is characterized by a plethora of grave threats impacting national security especially along the states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Despite grave threats, the year 2011 was a watershed moment in border guarding along the highly porous and unstable Indo-Bangladesh border. It put the Border Security Force (BSF) in a precarious position affecting the hardware and software of border security. The watershed moment was the acceptance of non-lethal strategy as tactical doctrine to deal with threats thereby compromising national security. It was an unthinkable proposition adopted to improve relations between border guarding forces. The proposition was an agreement to adopt non-lethal strategy by BSF as a tactical doctrine to tackle national security threats. The agreement was signed by ignoring the violent treacherous history of Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) targeting BSF personnel, patronizing illegal immigration, cattle smuggling, infiltration, radicalization and militant groups to destabilize the North East.
In 1998, a BSF inspector was killed in a general area in Dawki, Meghalaya by Bangla miscreants, followed by surrounding of Pyrdiwah village in Meghalaya by Bangladesh Rifles and killing of 16 BSF men in 2001 in Boraibari, followed by kidnapping of two BSF officers in Tripura in 2004 and thereafter killing of BSF officer on 16 April 2005 in Tripura. Had these incidents been analyzed realistically , the non-lethal agreement may not have seen the light of day. There is no denying the fact that attacks on BSF personnel have increased following implementation of non-lethal strategy. Recently cattle smugglers attacked the BSF party with sharp edged weapons despite the BSF using pump action guns in Malda in West Bengal.
Whether threats along the Indo-Bangladesh border justify non-lethal strategy at tactical level needs analysis. Threats emanating on the Indo Bangladesh border are illegal immigration, infiltration, drugs, weapon and FICN smuggling, cattle and smuggling of perishable goods. These threats impact the economy, destabilize the demographic character of NE states especially border areas and cause societal disharmony. These threats cannot be addressed effectively through non-lethal responses. Strategy to address them through non-lethal force may be a serious miscalculation and hara-kiri, impacting both hardware and software of border guarding adversely. With a hostile regime in Bangladesh with ISI footprints, these threats have assumed structured character and can only be addressed through structured response which is the use of potent lethal means and not disorganized and unstructured non-lethal strategy.
Vulnerabilities along the Indo-Bangladesh border including Siliguri corridor need serious introspection and response . The Ministry of Home Affairs and BSF need to discard non-lethal strategies and focus on improving hardware and software of border guarding to strengthen border security. Government has been investing in improving the hardware of border guarding. It gained structured and coordinated traction after establishment of the department of border management. However, border guarding hardware needs substantive improvement through enhanced budgeting. The current increase, impressive in percentage terms, is inadequate for balanced development and upkeep of border guarding hardware. BSF needs to present its case effectively and professionally to get more funds for strengthening border guarding hardware and software. Both hardware and software of border guarding need urgent attention to make men operationally and logistically effective.
The software of border guarding is low priority or no priority area whereas it is this which needs prioritized attention. For the effectiveness of hardware, the software must be healthy and sound. Weak software may render strong hardware ineffective and vice-versa.
What is border guarding hardware and software? Border man, weapons and equipment, terrain, border out posts (BOPs) surveillance devices, border pillars, border fence, flood lights, border road, intelligence network, border population, border area development programme, integrated civic action programme form the hardware of border guarding. It requires continuous upkeep, innovation and upgradation. Old, outdated and unkempt hardware may become a liability in effective border guarding. Hardware is kept under watch by men and its effectiveness depends upon the effectiveness of strategy to thwart threats through effective use of weapons. But with non-lethal strategy in force, there is reluctance on the part of men and leadership to use lethal force even when attacked. This is well known to smugglers and anti-national elements who feel emboldened to carry out their activities. Thus, non-lethal strategy needs reconsideration and must be discarded in the interest of national security.
The software of border guarding is professionalism of leadership and men and their acumen to use professionalism at macro and micro levels, mental toughness of leaders and men to withstand extreme hardship. Also treating border security as a sacred ritual and driving force to boost morale and motivation without unduly getting affected by the external environment dictated by service conditions and societal and familial responsibilities is integral. While Governments and border guarding forces put enough focus on hardware of border guarding, there is very little done to strengthen the software of border security which must be agile and active for ensuring effectiveness of hardware. It is this weak software which drives men to commit suicides and incidents of fratricide
The first step in strengthening software is basic training for both leaders and men. Training curriculum stands highly diluted and bereft of the mental toughness regimen which comes through putting men under harsh conditions to endure hardship and adversity. The need is to restore old methodology of training which focused on ground realities to develop mental toughness. There is a need to re-prioritize basic and in-service training curriculum to make it more practical and less theoretical. This will bring in self-actualization in men; drive their morale and motivation imbibing qualities of discipline, professionalism and integrity in them thereby making border guarding a highly professional enterprise in national security.
The first lesson is tough basic training followed by regular company and battalion training regime accompanied with long marches with full battle load as part of company and battalion collective training and renewed focus on weapon and equipment training. Border guarding software through realistic training will truly become professional and there will be rhythmic coordination between hardware and software thereby strengthening border security.
Considering the multiplicity and gravity of threats along the Indo-Bangladesh border, there is a need to strengthen border security through coordinated improvement in both hardware and software of border guarding and junk non-lethal strategy. For this to happen the Union Home MInistry should designate the Indo-Bangladesh border as highly sensitive and a highly vulnerable zone with threats carrying long term national security implications especially for the North Eastern Region. The Indo- Bangladesh border which was a problem area of yesterday and will be a problem area of tomorrow, needs structured lethal response in national security interest, not ad-hoc ad- interim response.
Hope those handling policy and conceptual level of border management realize the perils of non -lethal response and its long term impact on national security and initiate course correction.
(The writer is Commandant (Retd), Border Security Force)
