By Dawa Tshering
The Chinese president Hu Jintao will be in India to attend the BRICS summit next month, and will hold bilateral talks as to settle the lingering border dispute between the two countries. The Chinese position is that Arunachal Pradesh is part of Tibet and strategically important for the Chinese hold on Tibet. But India holds the view that it could not afford any territorial compromises in this region.
China ever since its emergence as a monolithic Communist state in 1949 was involved in boundary disputes with virtually every nation on its peripheries. It led to border wars with the former Soviet Union, Vietnam and India. In the case of Vietnam and India, the border wars were perceived by China as punitive wars.
China today has undertaken boundary settlements with virtually all countries with which it had disputes with the exception of India. Some in India hoped that with a generational change in leadership in China and with the economic, political and strategic rise of India, China may be prompted to move towards more accommodative stances on the China-India boundary dispute.
Endless rounds of border dispute negotiations have taken place between China and India. These have taken place at two levels, namely Joint Working Group (JWG) discussions which commenced in 1988, special representatives talks at the level of India’s National Security Advisers and Chinese vice minister level since June 2003. The JWG has already completed over fifteen rounds of discussions.
The standard responses after each round have been of the type that was stated in March 2006: The two special representatives continued their discussions for an agreed framework for the resolution of the boundary question in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.
Chinese leaders on visits to India come out with the oft-repeated statement that the boundary dispute should be left to future generations to resolve and meanwhile China-India relations in other fields should move forward. This is just an excuse to keep alive the border dispute as a strategic pressure point against India.
This leads to the question whether China is really serious about resolution of the China-India border dispute? The endless round of negotiations does not suggest so.
Symbolically, China’s reluctance can be read as dissatisfaction with growing US-India strategic relationship and keeping alive the border dispute as a strategic pressure point against India. Obviously China is actively involved in delays and prolonging the resolution of the boundary disputes for strategic reasons.
Veiled references in the past were made by Indian official spokesmen that progress could not be made as China was constantly pressurizing India to accept a swap by India of Tawang in lieu of Aksai-Chin.
China has now come out in the open to demand and advocate this proposal. An Indian news-report covering the closed door meeting organized between Chinese distinguished experts and Indian academics by China’s Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, which is part of the giant official Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, had this to report: Chinese experts said that China would be magnanimous on the issue of Aksai Chin area if India agreed to give up Tawang. The high-level Chinese experts which included former Chinese Ambassador to India Chen Rui Sheng made it clear that the border dispute could be solved if India handed over Tawang to China.
For the Chinese, Tawang is not just the Tawang Monastery region. For them Tawang implies the whole of India’s Arunachal Pradesh. So as not to dilute their claim, they officially will not call it that Arunachal Pradesh should be returned to them.
The strategic importance of Arunachal Pradesh or Tawang in Chinese parlance the following need to be recognized. Arunachal Pradesh provides strategic depth to India’s Brahmaputra Valley and India’s other Northeastern states. Arunachal Pradesh provides security to Bhutan on it entire Eastern flank by geographical contiguity. Bhutan would be then in a pincer group of China on both it flanks if Tawang is given away. This would be detrimental to India’s security. China’s borders would then rest on the plains of Assam; India might as well write off its other Northeastern states.
The Chinese obsession with the Tawang Region is totally strategic in its aims. In any future conflict with China and if India singly or in coalition with some other power develops offensive capabilities against China, this region offers the shortest cut to China proper and to Tibet. India’s communications infrastructure in this region developed in World War II for US military aid to China is existent and can be further improved. Arunachal Pradesh offers all-wealthier lines of communication to India for military needs to the Tibet border as compared to Aksai-Chin. In terms of any air operations by China in this region, Arunachal Pradesh would provide multi-layered air defence deployments on the ground as deterrence. The region is rich in terms of mineral and natural resources prospects.
There are many more reasons that one can state but the major ones should be enough. Arunachal Pradesh is of vital strategic importance for the territorial integrity and defence of India’s Northeast states and should be non-negotiable.
China would be politically naive of it perceives that in the 21st Century, a powerfully rising India would accept the bait of a Chinese strategic barter of Aksai-Chin in lieu of Tawang (read Arunachal Pradesh)
India would be more politically naive than China if it thinks that China would concede the area of Aksai-Chin through which passes its lifelines to keep Xinjiang under Chinese control.
Both in Aksai Chin and in the Arunachal Pradesh area, the strategic interests of China and India clash in the most intense manner. It would be a magical wonder if China can turn around to be strategically accommodative of India’s strategic sensitivities.
China’s strategic reluctances to solve the border dispute with India can therefore be expected to bedevil China-India relations for a long time to come. INAV