By Chiranjib Haldar
The fresh round of negotiations between the Union Government headed by interlocutor RS Pandey and the NSCN (I-M) though shrouded in secrecy hopes to hammer out a political settlement to the decades-old conflict. The extension of ceasefire between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN I-M) and the Government of India has been almost an annual ritual for the seventeenth year running since July 1997. The truce in Nagaland has been extended time and again though the parleys are still stuck in the rigmarole of territorial disputes. Though a ceasefire has been signed with NSCN (Khaplang), it has not been included in the latest round of negotiations. There is a third breakaway NSCN faction from the Khaplang group controlled by Khole Konyak and Khitovi Sema who are eager to be part of the peace process though New Delhi has so far kept this noveau outfit out of the huddle. Hence critics who believe all rebel Naga factions should be part of any dialogue process for an encompassing settlement may not be on the same page with our policy makers. In more than one and a half decades gone by and more than 80 rounds of talks, peace ushered in by the ceasefire albeit flawed as many suggest may have offered rich dividends for India.
The NSCN (I-M) may have realised that its vision of a ‘Greater Nagalim’ through a merger of Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur with Nagaland is a utopian unachievable dream. Sixteen years of negotiations have brought about tangible results for the Government of India and the NSCN (I-M) hardliners are not complaining because they also realise that 50 years of armed rebellion prior to the beginning of the ceasefire in 1997 has failed to deliver any concrete result either. The problem lies in an identity crisis for Thuingaleng Muivah, NSCN (I-M) General Secretary hailing from Manipur’s Ukhrul district, who has been vociferous on the territorial question since his own stature in Naga politics banks on the premise. Thus the NSCN (I-M) may now be softpedalling for a ‘special federal relationship’ a concept floated for the first time by Muivah in 2006 and lobbing the ball into the centre’s court.
But there are thorny issues which require afterthought and re-examination and NSCN (I-M) and New Delhi have both learnt from the past. When the BJP-led NDA regime extended the Naga truce to Manipur, there was unabated violence in Imphal and surrounding areas. The moot point was here was an ironical scenario where the government could invalidate one insurgent group but give birth to other forms of disgruntlement. Analysts have also pointed out that reinforcing the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and adopting the Basque separatists’ model of talking to the Spanish government may be the NSCN (I-M) leadership’s ploy to simply play to the Naga gallery. During the tenure of India’s key interlocutor, K Padmanabhiah and then since R S Pandey took over as chief interlocutor for talks with NSCN, this may have been Muivah’s strategy.
According to subsequent status papers issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, there has been continued inter-factional rivalries – the NSCN (Khaplang) offensive against NSCN (IM) – have resulted in militant fatalities in both the groups down the years. Despite sixteen years of truce, cadre strength of the various NSCN factions has not depleted. Though New Delhi has reasons to be happy about its strategic objective of keeping Naga rebels away from active militancy, the impasse has extracted its pound of flesh. Even with the ceasefire in force for more than sixteen years, the Naga factions have fought vicious internecine turf wars and conflict averse civilian Nagas have been often embroiled in unwanted violence.
For New Delhi it has been a carrot and stick policy; the bottom line is it may be better to stagnate in peace than in hostility. Both Muivah and Khaplang have always felt that semantically, it has been a ceasefire worth its merit. In the peace breakthroughs in the last seventeen years, the Indian interlocutors from Swaraj Kaushal, then Padmanabhiah and then RS Pandey have never gerrymandered or made the NSCN euphoric. The Government of India and the rebel outfits have both been the benefactors, giving the insurgent organisation another chance to reform or an honourable exit. Hence in the first decade of the ceasefire in force since July 1997, the preconditions were about setting up designated camps for the insurgents.
The ‘supra Naga state’ proposal conceptualised for the first time in 2011 has also fizzled out with the Congress firmly saddled in power in Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Both Chief Ministers Okram Ibodi Singh and Neiphiu Rio have benefitted extremely by opposing the ‘Greater Nagalim’ and ‘supra Naga state’ proposals, returning to power with bigger margins and sweeping their respective state assembly polls. New Delhi’s legerdemain has been proven just and correct with the nabbing of Anthony Shimray, a major arms procurer for the NSCN (I-M), in September 2010 thus unearthing his modus operandi to ship a huge consignment of ammunition from South East Asia. And topping it in the last three years has been the persistent pressure from the Government of India by castigating the NSCN (I-M) on the menace of growing rebel extortions.
Like the Mizo National Front, whose rebel leader Laldenga eventually formed the government in 1986 after a ceasefire, in the case of the NSCN (I-M), the ceasefire has been politically productive. Despite the braggadocio, they have not been able to topple any democratically elected government in Kohima. The implicit basis always was and still is that settlement ultimately reached has to be within the Indian Constitution or within acceptable limits of amendment to the Constitution. If the NSCN (I-M) or any bellicose group chooses to negotiate peace with the belief that anything beyond this is achievable, then they should be prepared for years of futile negotiations. This puts the ordinary citizens of Nagaland in total misery as they are berated by opposing laws, different extortion regimes and are expected to be loyal to the rebel fighters for the fear of being castigated either for betraying the cause or being a turncoat.
During the seventeen years of negotiations, the NSCN (I-M) has proposed two seemingly impossible propositions – ‘a special federal arrangement’ and a separate constitution under the arrangement. The Government of India has had serious objections to both the demands for it has categorically ruled out redrawing of any boundary of Northeast India for the territorial unification of Nagaland. Years back the legendary Naga rebel leader Phizo also accepted the Indian Constitution. New Delhi expects Muivah and Khaplang similarly to fall in line by extending the cessation of hostilities and accept the Indian constitution in its entirety. Now the third NSCN faction – the Khitove-Khole outfit, a splinter of the Khaplang group is yet to be part of the composite dialogue. But the Khitovi-Khole faction is a Naga rebel outfit which is ready to dump the concept of ‘Greater Nagalim’ unlike Muivah. Resolution to a complex crisis is an ongoing process and requires wherewithal. There may be no assurance that another group owing allegiance to the NSCN (I-M) will not break away and carry on their struggle as Isak-Muivah had done when the Naga National Council which initially spearheaded the insurgency, signed the Shillong accord with then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1975. But a solution to the imbroglio could be in sight given New Delhi’s persistence for the last seventeen years.
(The writer is a commentator on South Asian affairs: Contact email: [email protected])