By Kanwal Sibal
The Pathankot attack has once again exposed our failure to develop an effective strategy to counter Pakistan’s use of terror as a political tool against us. Each time a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack occurs, our dialogue gets interrupted.
It is resumed after an interval because Pakistan is seen to be gaining diplomatic advantage internationally by our rejection of dialogue. We are sensitive to US diplomacy, which plays in favour of dialogue resumption. Within the country, too, major newspapers and well-identified commentators push for resumption.
In some cases, even those officially responsible for our foreign and security policies treat the issue of terrorism as secondary and advocate dialogue. All this shows the brittleness of our approach to terrorism.
We are told that it is in our own interests to have a dialogue with Pakistan and we should not let terrorists disrupt it. One could understand if – during the process of a productive dialogue with Pakistan, that steadily moves the two countries towards normalisation, sporadic acts of terrorism occured, which were then investigated, the perpetrators punished, and steps taken to prevent further acts. In that case, we might take the position that breaking dialogue would not be in our interests as we would be doing exactly what the terrorists want.
But if the dialogue has been largely sterile, Pakistan has remained adamant on its ‘core’ issues, those responsible for the Mumbai massacre have not been tried, and credible action against jihadi groups targeting India has been absent, this position loses force. How is it in our national interest in that case to persist in a barren dialogue that primarily puts the burden on us to produce ‘results’ and overlook terrorism?
The other argument, that a dialogue is needed to convey our expectations to Pakistan on the terrorism front and transmit evidence to Islamabad, assumes that Pakistan is unaware of our concerns and ignoring the evidence of Pakistan-based jihadi activity against India which has been provided.
In reality, terrorism has been on the agenda for years, and Pakistan is fully aware of what we expect. Pakistan has ignored our private and public exhortations on abjuring terrorism as an instrument of state policy, and has treated our evidence as literature.
If our expectations had been heeded by Pakistan and it had re-oriented its policies accordingly, there would be merit in continuing the virtuous process of a sustained dialogue. But, if, instead, terrorist attacks are staged on our territory periodically and leads provided are not pursued on grounds that additional evidence is needed and procedures have to be followed, then the argument loses merit. Put them to the test, experts say, as if Pakistan has not been tested for three decades.
It is claimed by dialogue supporters that each time talks have been successful in the past, terrorists have attacked – the more the success, the more severe the attack. Apart from the implication that we should not link dialogue and terrorism, it is not clear what these successes are.
The Mumbai attacks were supposedly in response to a breakthrough on Kashmir. The acceptability of this breakthrough, which has remained a national secret, has never been tested. This is true of the Pakistan side too, although former foreign minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has tom-tommed it.
This ‘success’, which was personality-driven, and not system-driven, on Pakistan’s side, remained embryonic, with its basis being rejected by Asif Ali Zardari and, in particular, Nawaz Sharif by their insistence on self-determination under UN auspices in Kashmir.
Some dialogue die-hards, who have been cogs in our Pakistan policy under the previous government and have treated Narendra Modi’s Lahore visit with withering contempt, argue that asking Sharif to take action against those involved in the Pathankot attack before FS-level talks amounts to laying down conditions. Others seek analogies from the latest episode of Star Wars to understand and address our Pakistan problem.
In their eyes, Pakistan’s insistence that it will not discuss terrorism unless Kashmir is also discussed does not amount to laying down conditions. Unless we discuss issues close to Pakistan’s heart, they say, we will not get them to act on our concerns, which indirectly justifies the use of terrorism against us, as the implication is that we invite it because we obdurately deny the room Pakistan wants on Kashmir.
We may have different views on the sagacity of Modi’s Lahore gesture, but having invested so dramatically in a renewed dialogue process with Pakistan, he is not wrong in demanding that Pakistan demonstrate its commitment to talks that Sharif has lobbied internationally, by taking action against those responsible for Pathankot.
This is not laying down a condition – this is giving an opportunity to Sharif to save the dialogue that he seeks from being aborted.
(The author is a former Foreign Secretary)