By Poonam I Kaushish
Neighbour or enemy? Both. Indeed, India-China relations are like playing a game of poker. Show no emotions even as one plans strategy, play is multi-causal, defiantly stand one’s ground and gamble on a winning hand. Both New Delhi and Beijing are doing just that, betting, with the underwritten message: Don’t mess with me.
The latest flashpoint is an 89 sq km Doklam area close to Chumbi valley at the corner of India-Bhutan-China tri-junction not far from Sikkim witnessing a face-off between Indian and Chinese troops after the Indian Army blocked construction of a road by the Chinese PLA. Whereby, India made plain that this was aimed at getting closer to its last military post on its border with Bhutan and China and represented a significant change of status quo with “serious” security implications for it.
China retaliated by accusing New Delhi of “trespassing” on its recognised “undisputable sovereignty” over the delineated boundary between them, accusing India of being a “third-party” to the China-Bhutan dispute and demanded withdrawal of Indian troops as a precondition for “meaningful dialogue” to resolve the situation. This stand-off resulted in not only cancellation of the Kailash Mansarovar yatra through Nathu La in Sikkim but also a bilateral between Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg as the climate was not conducive. Never mind a five minute guftagu.
Undoubtedly, this till yesterday unknown place, is important for India as it could allow the Chinese to further run roughshod over a key precept of India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Bhutan. China has no formal diplomatic ties with Bhutan and India through the 2007 Friendship Treaty serves as a virtual security guarantor of Bhutan.
The valley holds strategic significance for India, China as well as Bhutan. India sees it as a dagger pointed towards its so-called ‘chicken’s neck’ sector in the Northeast and rapid Chinese road construction in Tibet could make things difficult for India. At the same time, Sikkim is one of the few sectors where India has an advantage. China, citing the 1890 China-Britain treaty, calls Doklam its own while Bhutan has disputed the fact saying the convention applies to the India-Bhutan border, not Bhutan and China.
Questionably, does India have the appropriate diplomacy to counter China’s drive for supremacy in the region? Can it defuse this? What options does it have on the table?
And do the present assertive trends of Indian foreign policy portend the likelihood of an aggressive outcome?
Indisputably, New Delhi is busy countering China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy (befriending its neighbours to check Indian interests on multiple fronts) by claiming its space in Asia’s sun by forging alliances with Beijing’s neighbours. In its Look-Act East Policy it is engaging with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam etc. Aware of the deep inroads China has made in Myanmar New Delhi is making an effort to woo the generals back into its fold. Last month, Indian Army Chief Gen Rawat made an important trip to Myanmar.
Vietnam renewed a license granted to ONGC Videsh, to explore an oil block in the South China Sea which has seen disputes between China-Vietnam-Philippines, a clear indication that the decision is driven by strategic rather than commercial considerations since return on investment in the area is minimal.
Worse, a defiant Beijing prone to bullying smaller neighbours into submission through a mix of cheque book diplomacy and military heft, is trying to squeeze Indian influence and interests and circumscribe the foreign-policy choices of India’s smaller neighbours. Be it influencing Nepal’s domestic politics, funding Bangladesh’s new ports with the potential of dual-use in the foreseeable future, constructing roads through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir or drowning Sri Lanka in debt in order to gain eventual political leverage, Beijing continues to successfully block India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. It is furious about India’s rejection of the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, a personal prestige issue of President Xi.
Today, a chill has set in Indo-China ties. Deep mistrust and lack of confidence is apparent. Yet the two have not rejected dialogue, even when it is no more than a repetition of known positions. New Delhi cannot afford to take any chances with what constitutes India’s national security and strategic interests and pursue them doggedly.
Craft a long-term China policy that combines dialogue with diplomatic pressure. Simply inter-acting, is not a solution. We need to take the bull by the horns and hammer out differences across the table. Irrefutably, time for out-of-the-box thinking and guts. Beijing has to match its words with deeds.
Modi realizes only too well that in today’s geo-strategic political reality pragmatism dictate real politic. There are no short cuts. New Delhi needs an all-encompassing and multi-pronged strategy to deal with Beijing even as it wants durable peace though this alone cannot guarantee non-escalation.
What next? In this trilateral poker, New Delhi needs to watch out for two serious consequences. One, should it back off, it would send a signal to Bhutan and other neighbours that its policy of relying on India as protector is not good enough. Bhutan could establish formal diplomatic ties with China. Consequently, this could change the balance of forces in the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction in favour of China further imperiling the strategically-sensitive Siliguri Corridor.
Two, if India abandons Bhutan, it would showcase that New Delhi is not trustworthy and expecting it to stand-up against China is imprudent. To put it succinctly, its bark is worse than its bite. Certainly, a disaster for India’s elusive pursuit of regional primacy as an aspiring hegemon does not abandon allies.
Thus, New Delhi’s new assertiveness would need all the wisdom and restraint to ensure that it remains in control of the Indo-China script. Certainly, in this zero sum game the muscle-flexing and one-upmanship will continue till both get a face saver and back-off. The long-term prospects of India-China relations will be determined to a large extent by India’s strategic goals and objectives in the context of the evolving regional and global security environment.
There is definitely a strategic imperative of peace between the two Asian powers as both need to focus their energies and resources on the gigantic task of economic evolution necessitated by the changing competitive global environment. Modi is slowly changing the rules of the game from defensive posturing to being a hard negotiator whereby India is no longer China’s underdog but an equal, controlled aggressor.
Modi should take a leaf from ex-US President Nixon book The Real War: “Nations live or die by the way they respond to the particular challenges they face. The time when a nation most craves ease may be the moment when it can least afford to let down its guard. The nation that survives is the one that rises to meet that moment: that has the wisdom to recognize the threat and the will to turn it back, and that does so before it is too late.”
It remains to be seen if Modi will rise to the occasion and sustain his ‘zero tolerance to provocations’ policy as he navigates tricky ties with China. Tough responses to provocations and clear red zones are the best guarantee of peace in the sub-continent. An intoxicating mix of muscular diplomacy and ruthlessness masked in velvet gloves is the need of the hour. By changing the rules of the game, Modi has spelt out: It takes two to tango! —- INFA