By Shyam Saran
Prime Minister Modi’s belief in the power of personal diplomacy was in full display during his just concluded visit to China (May 14-16, 2015). While there were no bear hugs, the handshakes with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang were warm and friendly, the body language relaxed and the overall atmosphere one of comfort. The “Selfie” moment of the two Prime Minister’s at the Temple of Heaven in Beijing, is a first in the annals of Indian and Chinese histories. Whether at the historic city of Xian or in public venues at Beijing, the affable curiosity among ordinary Chinese was palpable. The speech at Tsinghua University was, I believe, one of the most successful exercises in public diplomacy. Modi’s first few words in Mandarin were a disarming stage-setting prelude to a serious and unusually frank acknowledgement of the sharp edges in the relationship even while articulating a vision of Asia in which both India and China are the drivers of both economic and cultural resurgence. The measure of what Modi was able to achieve is evident in the change in tone both in Chinese official and semi-official media and in social media before, during and after the visit. On the eve of the visit, positive coverage was interspersed with negative and sometimes even abusive comment. The level of enthusiasm for Modi has steadily increased with each day of the visit. One Chinese analyst even compared Modi’s visit to US President Nixon’s path-breaking visit to China in 1972.
One must acknowledge that the Chinese leadership went out of its way to give top billing to the visit, extending unprecedented courtesies to a visiting leader. In a different age, Prime Minister Nehru had also been accorded an unprecedented welcome in 1954 by the then Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. In the latter case, the promise of a defining relationship, pregnant with the possibilities of the 2 countries jointly shaping the contours of a post-colonial and post-war Asia, was soon shattered on the rocks of competing nationalisms and territorial claims. The Tibet issue, which first erupted in 1959 with the Dalai Lama seeking shelter in India, generated strategic distrust, which led to the 1962 border war, the subsequent Sino-Pakistan alliance directed against India and an enduring sense of rivalry which sometimes descends into outright hostility. Does the latest visit carry the potential of reversing this negative dynamic? Will style and symbolism lead towards substance?
In addition to his belief in personal diplomacy and the importance of establishing a close rapport with fellow-leaders, Modi also believes in the efficacy of strong economic and trade relations as an for instrument for reducing, if not eliminating strategic distrust. This, too, has been on full display during the visit, with the prominence given to the India-China Economic Forum of top-level CEOs and message of welcome to Chinese investors delivered eloquently by the Prime Minister himself. There were 24 Agreements and 21 business related MOUs concluded during the visit, with a combined value of $30 billion. The inclusion of some Chief Ministers of States in the Indian delegation and promoting provincial level engagement and cooperation is innovative. The setting up of consulates in Chengdu in China and Chennai in India will be helpful in promoting ties with China’s important South West region. However, it would be better if economic and trade relations are pursued on their own merits rather than with any political pay-off in mind. We have witnessed how even as dense an economic relationship as exists between China and Japan, has not prevented acute political tensions from erupting from time to time. China has much to offer in terms of investment capital and technology. But we must leverage China’s desire to benefit from India’s large and expanding market and investment opportunities, to obtain reciprocal access for India goods and services which have a competitive advantage such as pharmaceuticals, automotive parts and IT services. A joint working group to look into ways of addressing the persistent trade deficit in bilateral trade was announced by Foreign Secretary.
The ground realities which hold the relationship back remain and with the danger that like in the past, in a moment of unexpected crisis or unintended confrontation, relations once again plunge into outright hostility and renewed tensions. What the visit has achieved is a very frank articulation of these sources of tension i.e. the border issue, China’s activities in Pakistan and in our sub- continenal neighbourhood, the issue of stapled visas, the ballooning trade deficit and market barriers in China, and the continuing overhang of the Tibet issue. Modi has unambiguously, though in a positive frame, publicly called on China to adopt a different, more accommodating approach on some of these issues. That’s a plus, but must be persevered with.
The visit was also notable for what was missing. There was no reference in the Joint Statement to China’s ‘One Belt One Road’(OBOR) initiative, though pre-visit Chinese commentary had expressed the hope that India would be ready to join as partner. There was no reference to the two sides engaging in a Maritime Security dialogue, which has been agreed in principle but not yet followed up on. This means that India still harbours reservations about the OBOR and there remain possibilities of confrontation emerging as the respective naval footprints of the two sides continue to expand and intersect in the South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean.
Overall, one could say that the visit was a hopeful beginning and may have created the political ambience within which the more contentious issues could be managed better if not resolved.
Modi has consciously followed a strategy of building relations with one major power to enhance India’s leverage with other major powers. The China visit owes some of its success to the gains India made thanks to Modi’s reaching out to the US on the one hand and Japan on the other. He has also asserted India’s interest in the Indian Ocean with high profile visits to Sri Lanka, Mauritius and the Seychelles. This is a good strategy, but at the end of the day, the world will be watching to see how much of the promise translates into practical action and progress on the ground. The weakness of follow through processes is much more difficult to deal with than orchestrating a successful event. Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary
He is currently Chairman,RIS and Senior Fellow CPR.